Athens Journal of Social Sciences

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Published by the Athens Institute for Education and Research (ATINER)

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The *Athens Journal of Social Science (AJSS)* is an Open Access quarterly double-blind peer reviewed journal and considers papers from all areas of social sciences, including papers on sociology, psychology, politics, media, and economics. Many of the papers in this journal have been presented at the various conferences sponsored the Social Sciences Division of **the Athens Institute for Education and Research** (ATINER). All papers are subject to ATINER's Publication Ethical Policy and Statement.

Athens Journal of Social Sciences
Editorial and Reviewers' Board

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The current issue is the fourth of the eleventh volume of the *Athens Journal of Social Sciences* (AJSS), **published by the Social Sciences Division of ATINER.**

Gregory T. Papanikos
President
ATINER

Athens Institute for Education and Research
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19th Annual International Conference on Psychology
26-29 May 2025, Athens, Greece

The Psychology Unit of ATINER organizes its **19th Annual International Conference on Psychology, 26-29 May 2025, Athens, Greece** sponsored by the Athens Journal of Social Sciences. The aim of the conference is to bring together scholars and students of psychology and other related disciplines. You may participate as stream leader, presenter of one paper, chair a session or observer. Please submit a proposal using the form available (https://www.atiner.gr/2025/FORM-PSY.doc).

Important Dates
- Abstract Submission: **22 October 2024**
- Acceptance of Abstract: 4 Weeks after Submission
- Submission of Paper: **28 April 2025**

Academic Member Responsible for the Conference
- **Dr. Thanos Patelis,** Head, Psychology Unit of ATINER & Research Scholar, Fordham University, USA.

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- Athens Sightseeing: Old and New-An Educational Urban Walk
- Social Dinner
- Mycenae Visit
- Exploration of the Aegean Islands
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- Ancient Corinth and Cape Sounion

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Conference Fees
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Athens Institute for Education and Research
A World Association of Academics and Researchers

19th Annual International Conference on Sociology
5-8 May 2025, Athens, Greece

The [Sociology Unit](#) of ATINER is organizing its **19th Annual International Conference on Sociology, 5-8 May 2025, Athens, Greece** sponsored by the [Athens Journal of Social Sciences](#). The aim of the conference is to bring together academics and researchers from all areas of Sociology, Social Work and other related fields. Theoretical and empirical research papers will be considered. You may participate as stream leader, presenter of one paper, chair a session or observer. Please submit a proposal using the form available (https://www.atiner.gr/2025/FORM-SOC.doc).

Important Dates
- Abstract Submission: **1 October 2024**
- Acceptance of Abstract: 4 Weeks after Submission
- Submission of Paper: **7 April 2024**

Academic Member Responsible for the Conference
- **Dr. Domenico Maddaloni,** Head, Sociology Research Unit, ATINER & Associate Professor, University of Salerno, Italy.
- **Dr. Philip G. Cerny**, Director, [Social Sciences Division](#), ATINER & Professor Emeritus, University of Manchester (UK) and Rutgers University (USA).
- **Dr. George S. Tsagaris,** Associate Professor, Cleveland State University, USA.
- **Dr. Sharon Claire Bolton**, Head, Management Research Unit, ATINER & Professor, The Management School, University of Stirling, Scotland.

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Expectations of Immigrant Women and Older Adults on Encountering each other in Volunteer Work

By Sirpa Salin[*], Annukka Huuskonen[±], Hannele Palukka[°]
& Hannele Laaksonen[•]

Volunteer work is popular in Finland, but as in other European countries, immigrants are underrepresented in volunteer organizations. Volunteer work is known to have many benefits for both immigrants and older adults. However, the researchers could not find previous studies on the expectations of these two vulnerable groups for encountering each other in volunteer work. The purpose of this study was to describe the thoughts of immigrant women (n=19) and older adults (n=19) on volunteer work with older adults. The data were collected through individual interviews in 2019 and 2020. The data were analyzed through inductive content analysis. The results show that both groups had fears and prejudice towards both each other and volunteer work, but both also saw benefits in it. The immigrant women's descriptions emphasized limits caused by their culture and the lack of financial incentives. The older adults' descriptions did not mention these perspectives. The study produced valuable information on both groups' expectations on encountering each other in volunteer work. Both are beneficiaries, who must be trained in encountering each other. Training can be used to dispel prejudice, plan ways to spend time together and build trust between different parties. The responsibility for organizing training should be with the volunteer organization in charge of the project.

Study Background

The Finnish population is ageing more rapidly than expected during the current decade, resulting in a disadvantageous dependency ratio. Increased immigration has been suggested as a solution (Kotamäki 2020). While net immigration to Finland has approximately tripled since the 1990s, there is still little immigration to Finland compared to other European countries (Kotamäki 2020). From the perspective of sustainable population development, Finland needs immigrants and their participation in work and society. A functioning multicultural society will not come into existence on its own but requires active deeds and conscious decisions from both policymakers and regular citizens (Säävälä 2020).

One attempt to meet this challenge was a 2019-2022 project executed by a Finnish university of applied sciences and funded by the Asylum, Migration and

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Integration Fund (AMIF) of the European Union. Its goal was to strengthen immigrant women's participation in social activities and to improve their integration by developing a training model for volunteer work with them and for them. The training model was created based on experience gained in three workshops and six months of training. The project sought to advance cooperation between immigrant women and organizations providing services for older adults and provided an opportunity to learn more about Finnish volunteer work, organization work and the everyday lives of older adults (From Home to Home and Society - a model for training immigrant women to participate in society 2019 – 2021).

The Family Federation of Finland (Sorsa 2020) has set a welfare goal where each Finn has at least one close relationship. As people age, close and meaningful relationships are particularly important, as they have a significant effect on health and wellbeing. Loneliness and discrimination are harmful to all people (Sorsa 2020).

There is no single commonly accepted legal definition of volunteer work. There are many definitions, which have in common the keywords *unpaid activity* and *activity done for others out of free will* (GHK 2010). According to a survey (GHK 2010), Europe has different traditions of volunteer work and differently developed volunteer sectors, which can be seen in the statistics on participation in volunteer work. Finland was among the European countries with the second most active populations along with Luxembourg, Denmark, and Germany, in which 30-39% of the adult population performs volunteer work. The Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, and the United Kingdom are at the top of the list, as more than 40% of their adult populations perform volunteer work (GHK 2010). While volunteer work is popular in Finland, immigrants are underrepresented, particularly in the well-known volunteer organizations (Berhanu 2018). Immigrants are less active in volunteer work than the main population everywhere in Europe (Voicu 2013).

Studies show that participating in volunteer work has many health benefits to older adults in particular, such as slowing down cognitive impairment (Infurna et al. 2016) and lowering mortality risk (Okun et al. 2013). According to researchers, volunteer work has such significant health benefits that doctors should write "volunteer work prescriptions" to older adults (Infurna et al. 2016).

Older adults perform many kinds of volunteer work, such as instructing in peer sport groups, playing music at retirement homes and helping others in using the Internet. They participate in volunteer work based on their own interests and available time. Volunteers must be trained in their tasks, given support, guidance and instruction on the background organization. Advancing the wellbeing of volunteers and continuing the programs are significant factors (Toivoniemi-Matsinen and Harinen 2018).

A Norwegian study examined older adults' experiences of the health-improving benefits of volunteer work. The volunteer center is an important place, in which older adults feel connected to the community of volunteer workers. It offers a chance for personal growth and adjusting oneself to old age. The context of volunteer work and its organization were also important as experiences (Berg and Johansen 2017).

A systematic literature review by Posselt's research group (2018) identified eight enablers of immigrants' psychological welfare, which are 1) social support, 2) faith, religion and spirituality, 3) cognitive strategies, 4) educational and training opportunities, 5) employment and economic activities, 6) behavioral strategies, 7) political activity and 8) environmental conditions. A future-oriented way of thinking and finding purpose and meaning in life improve immigrants' welfare (Posselt et al. 2018).

Participating in volunteer work is an important way of increasing immigrants' social inclusion and integration into their new society (Berhanu 2018, Voicu 2013, Kim et al. 2016, Røgeberg 2016, Khvorostianov and Remennick 2017), as they have few contacts with the main population created outside of employment and education (Avenarius 2012, Gupta & Sullivan 2013). Highly educated immigrant women in particular seek self-fulfillment in volunteer work, as their experience shows that the education and work experience, they received in their countries of origins is not valued in their new country. Volunteer work allows them to help new immigrants in particular by offering them the chance to build and act in common support networks. Their work improves everyone's welfare and prevents social exclusion in particular (Khvorostianov and Remennick 2017).

Even though studies show volunteer work's undeniable advantages to all parties, everywhere in Europe immigrants are less involved in volunteer work than the main population, except in religious organizations (Voicu and Seban 2012). Citizens of developing countries in particular participate the least in volunteer organizations on average (Valentova and Alieva 2018). As the time they have spent in the new country increases, so does their participation in volunteer work, while second generation immigrants' participation levels are similar to the rest of society (Voicu and Seban 2012).

There has been a great deal of study into immigrants' participation in leisure activities (Cerber et al. 2012, O' Driscoll et al. 2013, Koca and Lapa 2014, Kim et al. 2016, Lenneis and Pfister 2017, Salin et al. 2021). However, there is little research into their participation in volunteer work (Barhanu 2018). On immigrants' volunteer work with older adults, the topic of this study, only a few project reports could be found.

The Finnish (Vehkasalo 2016) and Austrian (Loferer-Lainer 2019) project reports describe the experiences of people at senior centers on immigrants' volunteer work. According to both reports, both parties saw the experience as positive. Working as volunteers gave immigrants everyday activities to do and supported their learning the new language. They would tell the older adults about their own country and culture. Downsides included the short duration of their volunteer work, as immigrants' personal situations changed rapidly (Vehkasalo 2016).

This article uses the general term immigrant, which generally refers to people born abroad. They are people who have moved to Finland for various reasons such as family, work, education or being forced to leave their country of origin as refugees (THL 2021).

This study seeks to fill a research gap by gathering more information on immigrants and older adults' experiences of encountering each other as part of volunteer work.

Purpose and Research Tasks

The purpose of this study is to describe immigrant women and older adults' thoughts on volunteer work among older adults in Finnish society before the piloting stage.

The research tasks are the following:

1. How do immigrant women describe themselves as volunteer helpers of older adults?
2. How do Finnish older adults describe immigrant women as their volunteer helpers?

Data and Methods

Data Collection

The data consist of individual interviews with women who have immigrated to Finland (N=19) and older Finnish adults (N=19), conducted prior to their participation in training related to the project. The structured interviews with immigrant women were conducted as phone interviews in Spring 2020 (n=10) and finished in connection with the third and last workshop in early Fall 2020 (n=9). The interviews proceeded along two themes: *I as a helper to an older adult* and *the advantages and challenges of participating in volunteer work*. The following questions were formed: How good are you at encountering older adults? What interests you in encountering them? In your opinion, how do people encounter older adults in Finnish culture? What information do you need in encountering Finnish older adults? What factors could prevent you from participating in volunteer work with older adults? What benefits will you receive from participating in volunteer work with older adults? The final research data consist of fifteen pages of text written on a font size of 12 and a line spacing of 1.5. The immigrant women who participated in the workshop wrote their own replies to the above questions. The replies were copied word-for-word to a Microsoft Word file that ran seven pages. In total, the data for the immigrant women consisted of 22 pages. The interviews were conducted by three researchers working on the project.

The immigrant women had arrived in Finland as refugees or for other reasons in 2006-2019 from different countries in Africa, the Middle East, Asia and South America. All had at least a residence permit and their age range was 20-48. Three of the interviewees lived with their parents while all the others were married and, aside from two, had children. Sixteen of them were either studying Finnish or learning a trade, five were employed and a few were stay-at-home mothers.

The structured interviews with the older adults were conducted in their homes in different parts of Finland in late 2019 and early 2020. The interview questions were: How would you feel if an immigrant woman came to your home to help you with everyday tasks? What kinds of tasks could she help you with? In what ways could you help her? The interviewers were healthcare students at a university of

applied sciences interviewing their acquaintances or grandparents. The interviews were recorded and transcribed word-for-word. The data consisted of 94 pages of text on a font size of 12 and a line spacing of 1.5.

Fifteen of the older adults were women and four men. Their age range was 70-96. Fifteen lived at home either alone or with a spouse, and four lived alone at senior houses. The interviewees were in good condition and independent aside from two interviewees, one of whom had a mild memory disorder and one a mobility-limiting disease.

Data Analysis

Both sets of data were analyzed using data-driven content analysis (Kyngäs et al. 2020). The analysis was initiated by reading the immigrant women's data set, after which the text was condensed and grouped into subcategories. The subcategories were further grouped into main categories, which formed the immigrant women's descriptions of voluntary work with older adults. Table 1 contains an example of the analysis and its process.

Table 1. *An Example of the Analysis of the Immigrant Women's Data*

Original Expression	Condensed Expression	Subcategory	Main Category
In my culture, we are taught to behave politely towards old people	• *In my culture… polite behavior towards old people*	*Appreciative encounter*	*Dialogic and activity-based encountering*
I let the elder have a chance to tell their story	• *I let … tell their story*	*Listening*	
I'm good at reading newspapers, doing hair, paintings nails, I can give them food	• *Good at reading* • *Good at doing hair and nails* • *Can give food*	*Activities*	

Ethics of the Study

The research project and the related research topic are based on two vulnerable groups' experiences of living in Finnish society. The results can be used directly in advancing the wellbeing and social participation of both immigrant women and older adults.

The immigrant women who participated in the phone interviews (n=10) had previously voluntarily participated in the first two workshops of the project, during which they had been asked for their willingness to participate in later data collection. Their interviews were originally meant to be conducted in person but were instead conducted via phone due to the coronavirus pandemic. As the pandemic eased in late Summer 2020, the third workshop was conducted in-person after a six-month delay.

The permission to conduct the study in connection with the immigrant women's (n=9) third workshop was obtained from the organization participating in

the project, following their research permission protocol. The older adults who participated in the study were private individuals in charge of their own lives, so their conscious permission to participate in the study was sufficient.

The study was conducted following good scientific practice and the ethical principles of human subject research (TENK 2019). The interviewees participated in the study voluntarily and were informed of the study's purpose and the use of their data both orally and in writing. The covering letter emphasized the voluntary nature of their participation, the interview's confidentiality and the anonymity of the analysis. The name and contact information of the person in charge of the study was provided in the covering letter, which gave the immigrant women and older adults the option of discussing the study with the researcher.

Results

Immigrant Women's Description of Volunteer Work with Older Adults

The immigrant women's (n=19) descriptions formed five main categories of their views on volunteer work with older adults (Table 2).

Table 2. *Immigrant Women's (n=19) description of Volunteer Work with Older Adults*

Example of Condensed Expression	Subcategory	Main Category
• Own cultural background • Experience working with elders • Caring attitude	Appreciative encountering	Dialogic and activity-based encountering
• Skill to create a connection • Skill to be present • Listening	Listening	
• Household skills • Cooking skills • Beauty skills • Doing together	Activities	
• Understanding old person speech is hard • Weak Finnish skills	Fears related to understanding speech	Fears related to encountering and being understood
• Not knowing the person before • Allowed topics • Problems caused by age	Fear of encountering	
• Fear of family receiving publicity • Fear of being accused	Fear of publicity	
• Immigrant's prejudice about Finns • Finn's prejudice about immigrants	Broadening cultural competence	Cultural learning and integration
• Learning about the social	Learning about Finnish culture	

system • Learning Finnish • Learning about work culture	and society	
• Learning about ageing • Learning about managing life	Learning from the life stories of older adult	
• Gaining a Finnish friend • Strengthening social network	Broadening social relationship	
• Limits related to gender • Conditions related to actions	Limiting cultural rules	Limits caused by one's own culture
• Time management challenges • Lack of compensation in volunteer work	Lack of payment in volunteer work	Lack of financial incentives

Dialogic and Activity-based Encountering

Appreciative encountering, listening and activity-based encountering emerged as the immigrant women's areas of expertise. Appreciative respect for older adults was rooted in their own cultural background, in which older adults were appreciated and respected. From a young age, children are taught to treat older adults with respect. The interviewees also had personal experience in helping older adults in their countries of origin, in which caring for the wellbeing of older adults was expected.

> "in my culture, the family cares for its elders well."

The immigrant women described their good intercommunication skills as their strengths. They were social and had the ability to create a connection with an older adult. Genuine presence, listening and discussion were their methods for successful intercommunication. They were genuinely interested in the stories of older adults.

> "I am good at face-to-face meetings, I give the elderly a chance to tell their story."

The immigrant women described their skills as one of their strengths as helpers of older adults. They were skilled at tasks related to cooking and housekeeping, which they hoped they could do together with older adults. They were also skilled at beauty-related tasks.

> "I'm good at reading newspapers, doing hair, painting nails, I can give them food."

Fears Related to Encountering and Being Understood

In interviews with the immigrant women, fears related to understanding speech, encountering older adults and publicity emerged. The immigrant women named communication problems as their weaknesses as helpers of older adults. Their ability to speak Finnish was not yet sufficient. They felt that it was difficult to

understand the speech of older adults because of e.g., dialect words and a quick speech tempo. They were afraid of mutual misunderstanding, particularly if the older adult only spoke Finnish. The interviewees saw language skills as paramount so they could share their own emotions and knowledge with older adults.

"hard to communicate, if the old person only speaks their native tongue."

The immigrant women also felt that it was difficult to encounter an older person, as they did not know each other previously. The interviewees considered age-related problems such as potential illnesses, particularly ones related to memory and questions related to functionality. It was also difficult to know which topics were allowed and which forbidden in discussions.

"we need information about how they feel about foreigners, I don't know any Finnish elders."

The immigrant women described their skepticism for the ultimate purpose of volunteer work. They feared that participating might bring publicity to their family, which they did not want. The fear of being photographed secretly and being interrogated and charged by officials made them suspicious of volunteer work.

"there may be suspicions that by joining you may end up in front of a judge."

<u>Cultural Learning and Integration</u>
The immigrant women described broadening their cultural competence and social relationships and learning about Finnish culture and society as opportunities provided by volunteer work. They also felt that it was important to learn from the life stories of older adults.

The immigrant women described volunteer work with older adults as a way of dispelling prejudice on both sides. They themselves had preconceived ideas of Finnish older adults and knew that older adults had ones about them. Volunteer work would be a good way of removing prejudice, as it offers a chance of becoming acquainted with a person different from oneself and broadening one's cultural competence.

"chance to break immigrants' prejudice about Finnish elders, fixing elders' prejudice."

The interviewees also mentioned learning about Finnish culture and society. The immigrant women described older adults as teachers who would teach them about Finnish history, service system, social systems and work culture. Being able to practice Finnish was another benefit.

"to learn from old people how to manage in Finnish circumstances."

The immigrant women felt that by doing volunteer work they could learn from older adults' life experience in many ways. Aside from learning about old age as such, they would learn about being an older adult in Finnish society. They would also learn about adulthood from older adults. The immigrant women felt that older adults' stories of survival could teach them a great deal.

"elders teach you what it's like to be old."

A significant benefit of volunteer work was the chance of making a Finnish friend, who could show what it is like to spend time with a Finn. Making a Finnish friend would mean broadening and strengthening one's social network, as volunteer work could also serve as a way of becoming acquainted with an older adult's family and the organizers of the volunteer work. The interviewees felt that volunteer work would also give their children a good way to become acquainted with an older adult, whom they would learn to respect and even help. A mother said the following:

"if the place was good for a child, they too could spend time with the elder."

Limits Caused by One's Own Culture

The immigrant women described their own culture as causing limits to their volunteer work and that rules related to gender could prevent some activities. For instance, swimming involves cultural norms that would prevent volunteer work. Regulations related to religion also had to be considered. The immigrant women suspected that older adults might not receive them because of their headscarves and the color of their skin.

"if the activity involved swimming, I could not participate."
"old people are scared of the headscarf!"

Lack of Financial Incentives

The immigrant women also described their commitment to volunteer work. Challenges related to time management, such as taking care of their children, studying and other plans for the future made them question their ability to commit to volunteer work. The lack of payment could even prevent their participation. The interviewees found it hard to understand the nature of volunteer work as non-paying work.

"the lack of pay can be an obstacle for volunteering."

Finnish Older Adults' Description of Immigrant Women as their Voluntary Helpers

Three main categories emerged from the older adults' (n=19) descriptions of immigrant women as their voluntary helpers: the multiformity of volunteer work, ambivalent attitude towards immigrants and the requirements for successful volunteer work (Table 3).

Table 3. *Finnish Older Adults' (N=19) Description of Immigrant Women as their Voluntary Helpers*

Example of condensed expression	Subcategory	Main Catergory
• Exercising together • Going to theater • As friend and company, discussion partner • Being a substitute grandpa	Being and doing together	Multiformity of volunteer work
• Helping with food • Helping in sauna • Helping with changing sheets • Helping maintain home	Helping with everyday household tasks	
• I can explain the Finnish social system • Teaching Finnish customs • Teaching Finnish • Teaching Swedish	Acting as a teacher and advisor	
• They're people just like us • Positive idea of immigrants • Need to agree to their customs and understand • Doesn't matter who does it, as long as it gets done	Accepting	Ambivalent attitude towards immigrants
• Finns must be allowed to maintain their own culture • Keeping own faith • We don't need to accommodate foreign customs	Skeptical	
• Being someone's trusted person in demanding • Observing before trusting • Supervisor with initially to explain and answer questions • Trust in shopping with receipt and money	Building trust	Requirements for successful volunteer work
• Finns are grumps • Bad language skills, need to be patient • Am I naïve • Must be a nice person	Both parties' personalities	

Multiformity of Volunteer Work

The older adults described the multiformity of volunteer work as spending time and doing things together. They could go to shops, theaters, cafes and outdoor activities together. They could make dishes from both cultures together. In the ideal scenario spending time together leads to friendship. In such scenarios, the older adults described themselves as functioning as substitute grandparents.

> *"if we get along well, we could do all sorts of things together, I see no reasons she couldn't come with me to the theater or to a concert, for instance."*

Helping with everyday tasks was a significant form of volunteer work. They wished for help with maintaining their home and personal hygiene. Cooking and shopping were also mentioned as important factors they needed help with. They also mentioned needing help with visiting doctors and other services.

The older adults also thought of themselves as potential teachers and advisors to the immigrant women. Their own background and interests defined what they could teach to their helpers. They saw the Finnish social system, its functioning and work culture as important topics to teach. Volunteer work would also offer an excellent chance of teaching the immigrant women Finnish or Swedish, the two official languages in Finland. They saw faster integration into Finnish society and opportunities of entering the workforce as benefits. One interviewee presented the following as a condition:

> *"you can't push advice on someone if they don't want it"*

Ambivalent Attitude Towards Immigrants

The older adults' positive attitudes towards immigrants could be seen in positive descriptions of them. They were seen as ordinary people like any other. They also wished for more immigration to Finland, as they were worried about population decline. They did not care about nationality, as long as they were eager to perform volunteer work. The interviewees thought that Finns should also be interested in immigrants' concerns and respect must be mutual. They did not care who handled necessary tasks, as long as they were done.

> *"every person can do their job, I have nothing against anyone. Everyone is welcome. We're all the same on the inside…"*

A skeptical attitude towards immigrants could be seen in worries about the preservation of one's own culture, in case they must adjust to foreign cultures or religion. The interviewees were also afraid of the immigrant volunteers stealing from them. They did not wish to have to watch over their property. The skeptical attitude was enforced by negative newspaper articles about immigrants.

> *"I don't like that we should start acting according to their customs. And I want that we can keep our own culture, that we don't have to adjust to others. I want us to be what we are and sing our old songs."*

Requirements for Successful Volunteer Work

According to the older adults, building trust was a requirement for successful volunteer work, as they would be letting a new person into their home. Trust could not be built instantly but would require time. Trust requires a great deal from both parties. According to the interviewees, the Finnish habit of observing first is a good way of building trust. In the context of volunteer work, they said it would mean initially having a supervisor from the volunteer organization participating in

the visit. Their task would be to explain the system and answer questions from both parties.

> *"safety is important to me, and I probably wouldn't let an unknown immigrant woman into my home easily, if we were meeting for the first time. The first meeting could be somewhere else, and if we got along, why couldn't we be friends?"*
> *"I wouldn't want an unknown person to come to my home to help, because she's a stranger. What if they want to take advantage of me somehow"*

Personalities of both parties were important requirements for successful volunteer work. The older adults considered Finns "grumps" who do not know how to give anything to the immigrant unless specifically asked. The older adults considered the communication problems caused by the lack of a common language. They considered misunderstandings inevitable. A pleasant personality could, however, compensate for a lack of language skills.

Discussion

Analysis of the Results

Based on the results of the study, immigrant women and older adults' descriptions of encountering each other in volunteer work were in many ways similar. Both parties had prejudices towards both each other and volunteer work. Both also emphasized the mutually beneficial potential of volunteer work. The immigrant women also assessed volunteer work from the perspective of limitations caused by their own culture and a lack of financial incentives. These perspectives were not present in the descriptions of the older adults.

Based on earlier research literature, voluntary work is a significant factor in immigrants' integration into their new society (Voicu 2013, Kim et al. 2016, Røgeberg 2016, Khvorostianov and Remennick 2017, Berhanu 2018). Säävälä (2020) notes that integration is not only something done by immigrants, but something that must be built by strengthening receptivity and equality on both the social and individual level. This requires flexibility, learning and the ability to change from all parties. Many of the older adults participating in this study recognized this demand by naming their own tasks in helping to integrate the volunteer worker. They understood the benefits of immigration both to the incomers and to themselves (Säävälä 2020).

Immigrant women and older adults encountering each other in volunteer work offers a good chance for mutual learning (Vehkasalo 2017). The results of this study are partially similar, as the immigrant women saw themselves as learners rather than teachers. Volunteer work with older adults would offer them a view of Finnish culture and society from the inside. The immigrant women wished to learn about society, ageing and ways of managing life. Experiential knowledge is irreplaceable, alongside other sources of knowledge. The older adults in this study were prepared to meet this wish.

According to earlier studies, immigrant women, particularly those from developing countries, often become stay-at-home mothers, which limits their contact with the main population (Avenarius 2012, Gupta and Sullivan 2013). However, research shows that work, education and learning the local language are the best ways of integrating into the new society (Gupta and Sullivan 2013, Calzada et al. 2016). If these are lacking, particularly from immigrant women's lives, integration is difficult. Immigrant women must be offered activities that are culturally acceptable to them. One such activity is volunteer work with older adults, as it is work in a familiar context. The women in this study came from cultures where older adults were cared for within the family until the end of their lives, so helping and caring for older adults was familiar to them since childhood.

The older adults in this study saw building trust as a requirement for successful volunteer work. This requires an opportunity to become acquainted. Volunteer organizations should thus have people responsible for guiding participants in both their organization's practices as well as interpersonal encounters. Organizations should develop their practice as an important way of integrating and including immigrant women in society (Berg and Johansen 2017, Toivoniemi-Matsinen and Harinen 2018). Older adults, who often suffer from loneliness, and immigrant women, who often lack contact with the main population, are both beneficiaries. In the ideal case, both gain a friend and a significant relationship.

Reliability

The reliability of the study is examined from the perspective of the entire research process and assessed for its believability, transferability, dependency and confirmability (Kyngäs et al. 2020).

The data reported in this study were gathered as part of the *From Home to Home and Society - a model for training immigrant women to participate in society* project. The purpose of the project is to strengthen immigrant women's participation in society and advance their integration by forming a model for volunteer work with them and for them. The model is aimed for volunteer work with older adults.

The interviews with the older adults were conducted by students in higher education as part of their project studies. The conductors of this study trained the students for the interviews by going through the questions carefully and emphasizing that they must not ask questions other than the ones provided by the researchers. They were also instructed on the interview technique and recording and transcribing the interview. The interviews provided answers to the pre-determined questions, but the answers were not deepened through follow-up questions. As there is little research on the topic, the descriptions provided by the interviews are a valuable introduction to understanding the phenomenon. After the first 13 interviews, six more were conducted to achieve data saturation (Kyngäs et al. 2020).

The interviews with the immigrant women were conducted by three experienced researchers either in Finnish or English. They were sent the questions

in advance to allow them to prepare for the interview. Despite this, some of the interviews remained superficial due to a language barrier. The data collection was continued in Fall 2020 as part of a workshop organized for the target group. The immigrant women responded to the open questionnaire independently. The questions were the same as in the phone interview. The respondents' Finnish skill level was fairly high, and they were able to express their thoughts decently well.

In analyzing the two data sets, the researchers avoided interpreting the data beyond their stated meaning. This was done to avoid the researchers' own assumptions influencing the analysis. The results of this study are only partially confirmed by previous studies, as the topic has received little scholarly attention. To increase confirmability, the researchers sought to report the different phases of the study diligently to enable the reader to assess the researchers' analysis (Kyngäs et al. 2020).

The data for this study consist of two data corpora, which are as such not comparable. However, both discuss multicultural encounters in the Finnish welfare society from the perspective of age and gender. Some of the immigrant women's low Finnish skills resulted in their answers being brief and occasionally hard to understand. Their answers may also have been affected by their position. It is possible they gave answers they assumed the researchers would want.

Analysis of the data yielded valuable information on how immigrant women describe themselves as actors and the benefits and challenges of volunteer work. The interviews with Finnish older adults yielded a description of their understanding of both themselves and immigrant women as actors and participants in Finnish society.

Conclusions and Further Research

There is little research on immigrant women and older adults encountering each other as part of volunteer work. Both parties are beneficiaries, who require training for encountering each other. Training can be used to dispel prejudice, plan common activities and build trust between parties. The responsibility for the training should ideally be with the volunteer organization.

Further research should examine both parties' experiences of volunteer work that has happened. It is also necessary to chart volunteer organizations' attitudes towards immigrant work and to examine volunteer work's effectiveness as an important factor in the wellbeing of both immigrants and older adults.

Acknowledgments

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Tame, Messy and Wicked Problems in Hybrid Management – The Perspective of Management Students

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Remote management has increased in Finnish society due to the COVID-19 pandemic. It will be needed even after the pandemic, as remote work has become a stable and fairly common method in various organizations. The purpose of this study was to chart the views of social and health care professionals studying management on managers' tame, messy and wicked problems. The study also examined in which contexts the respondents placed various problematic situations and phenomena present in organizations. The data were electronically collected from students (N=32) as qualitative data, which were analyzed through inductive content analysis and data quantification. Two main classes emerged from the data (f=313): the problems of ethical management (49%) and the problems of operations development (51%). Of the problems analyzed, 36% were classified as tame, 37% as messy and 27% as wicked. Tame problems were largely related to workplace communities, resource management and employee well-being. Messy problems mostly involved productivity, employee well-being and operations development. Wicked problems chiefly entailed workplace communities and operations development. Based on the results, hybrid management appears as in-person management in 40% and as remote management in 60% of the problems examined. The results can be used in developing hybrid management and culture and in the continuing education of managers. Further research is needed on the practical applications of hybrid management and the tame, messy and wicked problems of managers working on different levels.

Introduction

The role of managers in the Finnish social and health care field has changed due to digitalization, the pandemic and a broad reformation of the field. Starting in 2023, social and health care services, along with rescue services, are provided by 21 well-being services counties, to which 173 000 employees transferred from municipalities. Due to the changes in managers' work environment and the multi-location nature of their work, more demands and stressors are placed on their roles. The reforms have intertwined county services, while the increase in information and multiformity increases managers' workload (cf. Raisio et al. 2020, p. 108). The pandemic-caused leap into remote work in 2020 saw approximately one million Finns switch to remote work, but even before the pandemic remote

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work had increased due to digitalization, changes in attitudes and positive experiences of remote work (Ruohomäki 2020).

The move to remote work has made remote management similarly important as in-person management, which has caused organizations to develop practices of hybrid management. Hybrid management includes both remote and in-person management and aims to build a model that would contain the best parts of both. Remote and in-person management both require clear, commonly agreed-on goals, practices and definitions of responsibilities (Laaksonen and Bäckström 2022, Ristolainen et al. 2020). Hybrid management also involves the manager's remote work, which they can perform regularly as scheduled, irregularly and case-by-case, or as mobile work at different locations. Regular remote work can mean e.g., two to three scheduled days per week or a specified number of days per month. Combining remote and in-person work as efficiently as possible is a central goal (Eklund et al. 2021, pp. 12, 17, 24).

Remote management requires technological skills, as a significant portion of meetings, communication and information sharing occurs virtually (Laaksonen and Bäckström 2022). Unidirectional communication, such as routine information sharing, can be done via e-mail, text messages or chat channels, while complex or delicate matters are better handled in-person (Hill and Bartol 2018). The most efficient media for conflict resolution are primarily in-person meetings and secondarily video conferences (Eklund et al. 2022, p. 104).

Remote communication requires remote communication skills, proper, functioning equipment and skills in their use. The challenges of video-based remote meetings are creating genuine interaction and a good atmosphere. (Ristolainen et al. 2020). Creating new practices that increase interaction and cooperation is important, as sufficiently effective remote meetings lessen or even negate the need for in-person meetings (Ollila et al. 2018, p. 247). It is, however, challenging for managers to become acquainted with new employees remotely (Ravelin, et al. 2021), which is why in-person meetings are still important.

The position and tasks of first-level managers are seen as challenging, as they are positioned between middle management and employees, both of whom have demands. Aside from personnel management and their basic tasks, first-line managers are increasingly required to have competencies related to law and strategic and economic management. Managers work as leaders of people and promoters of change, which requires multifaceted skills (Reikko et al. 2010).

The duties of future first-line managers in the social and health care field will increasingly focus on personnel management, particularly recruitment and employee well-being. Providing sufficient and equal attention and support to employees in various situations has been discussed by e.g., Pirttilä et al. (2019), along with the previously mentioned studies. Concrete personnel management tasks that are seen as challenging include intervening in harassment situations, giving employees warnings, ending employment contracts during trial periods and intervening in low work morale (Laaksonen 2019, Laaksonen 2017). Resolving conflicts is one of the main challenges in personnel management (Laaksonen and Ollila 2022). Such situations often involve strong emotions such as fear, hate or shame. Long-term

conflicts have an adverse effect on work, productivity and employee well-being and atmosphere (Järvinen and Luhtaniemi 2013).

Management involves moral principles, values and virtues, which guide managers' actions in problematic situations and decisions. An ethical manager applies ethical principles and practice guides and seeks to behave in accordance with ideals such as justice, equality and objectivity (Viinamäki 2009). In a study of Finnish managers in different fields, the most ethical problems were caused by matters related to resource usage, achieving economic aims and the expectations and demands of upper management (Huhtala et al. 2011).

This study theoretically defines problems as tame, messy or wicked and examines them as part of remote and in-person encounters in hybrid management. Many of the problems in management arise from social phenomena such as the social and health care reform, digitalization, the pandemic and the weakening of economic resources. Under these circumstances management work is increasingly challenging due to factors such as the wide-scale employee shortage and problems with employee well-being, which are also related to questions of attracting and retaining factors in personnel. These factors create their own tame, messy and wicked problems.

The theoretical foundation of tame, messy and wicked problems comes from the famous 1973 article by Rittel & Webber. The topic has since been discussed and developed further in many international publications (e.g., Alford and Head 2017, Zellner and Campbell 2015, Grint 2005, Glouberman and Zimmerman 2002). In complex problems, the cause-and-effect relationships are not clear, which makes it difficult to solve things and predict the consequences. Different things are intertwined, and it is often impossible to be sure what affects which point and which factors affect the chain of events (Maguire et al. 2011).

This article studies the views of social and health care professionals studying management on the tame, messy and wicked problems of managers and on the contexts of solving such problems in remote and in-person management.

Literature Review

Tame Problems

Tame problems are stable and clear. Their basis and contents are fairly easy to understand and analyze. There are often clear models and methods for solving them and consensus can be built for solving them, especially if the solutions are supported by evidence-based knowledge (Raisio et al. 2018, Conklin 2006). To some extent tame problems are even routine-like, as they often contain a clear beginning and end, there are only a certain number of possible solutions, and the solutions may be based on concrete operational models. (Rittel and Webber 1973). The solution mechanisms for tame problems are also repeatable and transparent, and there are no great uncertainties or differences of opinion in solving them (Stacey 1996, Glouberman and Zimmerman 2002, Head 2022).

Tame problems are often linear and can be solved step by step (Conklin 2005), and for them a clear process can be found in the organization. In a tame problem, a clear definition of the problem helps reveal the best solution and the goal can be achieved in whole or in part (Kreuter et al. 2004). Grint (2005) has analyzed tame, messy and wicked problems through three work orientations of the manager. In tame problems, the manager uses a command orientation, in which they emphasize clear directions and quick answers. However, a tame problem can become messy or wicked if the problem is not caught in time (Vartiainen 2005).

Messy Problems

Messy problems are more demanding, both in understanding and solving them than tame problems. They are not individual problems or phenomena, but situations that involve many intertwining systems. A messy problem's cause or origin is not always fully clear. For this reason, they are difficult tangles, which when left unresolved become all the more complex and may turn into a wicked problem (see King 1993, originally Ackoff 1974, Head 2022). Messy problems generally cannot be solved alone, but require varied expertise, wide understanding and tested methods and practices.

Messy problems are a type of cluster that can be analyzed by looking at the entire cluster and the interaction of its different parts. This means that messy problems cannot be solved one tangle by one but must be confronted as a whole. King (1993, p. 106) states that "messes demand a commitment to understanding how things going on here-and-now interact with other things going on there-and-later". Managing messy problems requires system thinking and systemic approaches. This means that it is important to analyze and understand the overall picture of messy problems and their various interactions, without forgetting other related problems (Alford and Head 2017, Daviter 2017, Raisio et al. 2019).

Wicked Problems

Wicked problems have almost become a fashion phenomenon in the 21st century, and problems are characterized too easily as wicked. As with all problems, those facing them need sufficient information about the matter, experience in solving problems and knowledge of the relationships between things (Alford and Head 2017, McCall and Burge 2016).

Wicked problems and phenomena are more complex than the above and cannot in fact be solved, only survived (Daviter 2017). It is important to understand that attempts to solve such problems are living and ambiguous processes, in which matters become intertwined through various complex dependencies (Vartiainen et al. 2016). The cause-and-effect relationships between wicked problems and attempts to solve them are similarly unclear (McCall and Burge 2016). This further increases the situation's uncertainty and the difficulty of finding a satisfying solution or approach. The solutions to devilish problems are indeed unique and solutions tailored to each problem (Kreuter et al. 2024). It is therefore best to use nonlinear processes to discover the best possible solution (Parsons 2002, originally

Schön 1983). Replicating previous solutions is thus neither possible nor useful. The possible solutions to wicked problems must be discovered in the contexts in which they appear (Xiang 2013, Vartiainen and Raisio 2020, Lönngren and van Poeck 2021).

Wicked problems require asking questions, which is when the manager offers different solutions and perspectives (Grint 2005, Zimmerman 2008). In order to solve wicked problems, cooperation across organizational boundaries is needed. If possible, the involvement of customers and citizens is also useful in order to bring forth new thinking and new methods of operation (Danken et. al 2016, Clarke and Stewart 2000). It is paramount that solutions to wicked problems must be sought in the context in which they appear (Xiang 2013, Head 2022). In wicked problems, each attempted solution changes the problem itself and the final solution can be characterized as better, worse or sufficient (Kreuter et al. 2004). Later, the solution to the wicked problem may have to be changed, if e.g., circumstances change.

The study by Keiholehti (2020, p. 61) found that managing the threat of violence in the manager's work was a wicked problem, while Hartikainen (2022) confirmed that the decreasing attraction of the health care field was one. In the study by Kuikka (2020), the respondents believed that the most challenging wicked problems were related to relationships and interactions that involved conflict, inappropriate behavior and problems in cooperation.

Methods

Research Frame and Data

The purpose of this study is to chart the views of social and health care professionals studying management on the tame, messy and wicked problems in management and the contexts of solving them in remote and in-person management. The aim is to produce a theoretical analysis, which is used to depict managers' operative tasks in remote and in-person meetings. The research problems are the following:

1. What kinds of management problems do the respondents raise?
2. How are management problems divided into tame, messy and wicked problems?
3. What kinds of management problems do the respondents want to handle in-person?
4. What kinds of management problems do the respondents want to handle remotely?

This study is part of the project "Remotely more - work in social and health care is changing", for which permission was sought from Tampere university of Applied Sciences. The qualitative data were collected in Spring 2022 from master's degree students in social and health care management (n=32), of whom approximately 1/3 worked as managers and 2/3 as employees in the social and health care field. The respondents had an average of 14 years of experience in the

field. More than half of the respondents had a Registered Nurse degree. Other background degrees included Social Work, Church Social Work, Radiography, Bioanalysis and Physiotherapy.

The study was conducted as a course's preliminary assignment, for which directions were given on the Moodle learning platform. The instructions comprised of two video recordings and written instructions. The first recording contained oral instructions for the assignment and the second a specialist lecture that defined tame, messy and wicked problems. The participants had the opportunity of watching the video multiple times before completing the assignment. The respondents were provided with a table containing three columns, which they were instructed to fill with tame, messy and wicked problems. They were instructed to classify the problems in the following way: 1 = in-person meeting, 2 = any meeting, 3 = video meeting and 4 = other remote meeting. No personal or background information was collected on the table.

The participants were first instructed to consider managerial tasks and categorize them as tame, messy and wicked on the chart as a solo assignment. After completing the task, the students assembled in groups on the Teams platform, where they processed their individual results of tame, messy and wicked problems and numbered them based on in which contexts they would prefer solving each problem. The groups submitted their responses to a closed submissions area on the Moodle platform, which could only be accessed by the researchers.

The respondents had marked numbers (1, 2, 3, 4) next to the expressions based on which context they considered primary for solving the problem, followed by what they considered secondary options. Only problems whose only marked context was in-person meetings were included in the category of in-person meetings (category 1). Other categories were filled based on which context had been marked first. "Any meeting" and "other remote meeting" were combined into a category called "other meeting".

Methods of Analysis

The data were analyzed through inductive content analysis and data quantification (Tuomi and Sarajärvi 2006). Tame, messy and wicked problems were each analyzed through data-driven content analysis. Two researchers participated in the analysis. The first one read the data several times searching for similarities and differences, after which they grouped the data into sub-classes and classes. The second researcher studied the tables created by the first researcher based on their analysis and commented on the results. The researchers then sorted the results of the final analysis into sub-classes, classes and two main classes. The data, 3476 words, consisted of brief expressions, most of which were already greatly compressed (e.g., Table 1).

Table 1. *An Example of the Inductive Content Analysis*

ORIGINAL EXPRESSION	COMPRESSION	SUB-CLASS	MAIN CLASS
-Constant tardiness **-Constantly exceeding working hours** **-Overtime, exceeding working hours at own leisure** **-Failure to follow working hours** **-Misusing working hours, long lunch breaks, etc.**	- Constant tardiness - Constantly exceeding working hours -Overtime at own leisure -Not following working hours - Misusing working hours, long lunch breaks	Intentional non-compliance with working hours	Questions of workplace responsibility
-Violence **-Sexual harassment** **-Racism**	-Violence -Sexual harassment -Racism	Harassment	Workplace community problems

Data quantification was performed by manually counting frequencies for the tame, messy and wicked problems in the data. After this, frequencies were manually counted for the contexts for solving tame, messy and wicked problems (in-person meeting, video meeting, other meeting) (Tuomi and Sarajärvi 2006).

Ethical Considerations

The study was conducted according to the Finnish National Board on Research Integrity TENK's Guidelines for the responsible conduct of research (TENK 2012, p. 6). Study permission was sought from the X organization. The participants were given a data protection notice and informed of the granted study permission. The study collected no personal or background information. The assignment was part of the respondents' course and thus mandatory, but they were given the option of not sharing their responses for research purposes. In this case their responses would have only been used for the purposes of the course. No respondent refused permission. The respondents' names and identifiers were not recorded, and the results have been presented in a way that makes identifying their individual opinions impossible.

Results

Tame, Messy and Wicked Problems in Management

In a manual count, 313 problems were discovered in the data. Of these, 25% were categorized as workplace community problems, 20% as employee well-being problems, 17% as operations development problems, 17% as productivity problems, 13% as resource management problems, 5% as work responsibility problems and 3% as quality assurance problems. Of the problems, 36% were tame, 37% messy and 27% wicked. The problem subclasses were grouped into seven classes, which are presented in table 2. Problems of work responsibility and

quality assurance only appeared in tame problems. Productivity problems were never tame and mostly appeared as messy problems. Workplace community problems were clearly the largest group within wicked problems. Operations development problems appeared mostly in messy problems and least in wicked problems (Table 2).

Table 2. *The Abstracted Classes for Tame, Messy and Wicked Problems*

Problem classes	Tame problems (f=111) %	Messy problems (f=117) %	Wicked problems (f=85)%
Quality assurance	8	0	0
Work responsibilities	14	0	0
Operations development	16	16	19
Workplace community	19	14	49
Employee well-being	20	26	11
Resource management	23	13	2
Productivity	0	31	19
Total	100	100	100

In this study, the problems of workplace community, employee well-being and work responsibility have been abstracted into problems of ethical leadership, which form 49 % of the data. Problems of ethical leadership appeared most often in tame and wicked problems (Table 3). Workplace community problems included e.g., misconduct, conflict, referrals for treatment, harassment and ending employment contracts during trial periods. Questions of responsibility contain e.g., neglecting tasks and ground rules, avoiding tasks and forcing them on others, failure to commit to ground rules and instructions, exceeding one's position and refusing tasks. Problems of employee well-being included e.g., matters related to the equal treatment of employees, problems in workplace atmosphere, questionable absences and employees' working ability. Problems of workplace atmosphere included worsened atmosphere, lack of team spirit, cliques, negative atmosphere, negative attitude towards students and individual employees' lack of motivation.

Table 3. *The Number of Problems related to Ethical Management and Operations Development in Tame, Messy and Wicked Problems*

	Tame problems (f=111) %	Messy problems (f=117) %	Wicked problems (f=85) %
Problems of ethical management - workplace community problems, employee well-being problems, questions of work responsibility	53	40	62
Problems of operations development - productivity, operations development, quality control, resource management	47	60	38

One half of the data (51%) is related to operations development, which included problems related to productivity, resource management and quality assurance (Table 3). Operations development contained various problems related to change management, transmitting information, quality assurance, client

feedback, risk analysis, patient safety and lack of space and equipment. Problems of productivity included inefficient methods, lacking competences, resistance to change and factors related to operating culture. Inefficient operations included problems in work productivity and inefficiency, wrong methods, lack of orientation and lack of cooperation. Other problems of productivity include lacking competences in different fields and employees who cannot perform their tasks.

Problems of resource management included particularly work and vacation scheduling, finding substitutes and resourcing for orientation. Resource management also consists of the allocation of economic resources, agreement management and operational planning and monitoring. Problems of quality assurance included handling adverse events and client feedback, actualizing repairing feedback and feedback conversations and managing lacking competences (Table 3).

The Contexts of solving Tame, Messy and Wicked Problems

Of all reported meetings (f=313), 40.3% were classified as in-person meetings, 26% as video meetings and 34 % as other meetings. In-person and video meetings comprised roughly 2/3 of the data. Other meetings are common in tame and messy problems, while the respondents wanted to solve more than half of wicked problems in in-person meetings. The respondents wanted to solve 57% of tame problems in video and in-person meetings, 64% of messy problems and 82 % of wicked problems (Table 4). The respondents wanted to solve almost 90% of the problems of ethical leadership in video or in-person meetings. However, they would solve more than half of problems related to operations development in other meetings and 1/3 in video meetings (Table 5).

Table 4. *Number of Tame, Messy and Wicked Problems in the Data*

	In-person meeting %	**Video meeting %**	**Other meeting %**	**Total %Tame**
Tame problems (f=111)	33	24	43	100
Messy problems (f=117)	38	26	36	100
Wicked problems (f=85)	54	28	18	100

Table 5. *Number of Problems of Ethical Management and Operations Development in In-Person, Video and Other Meetings*

	In-person meeting %	**Video meeting %**	**Other meeting %**
Problems of ethical management (f=156) - workplace community problems, employee well-being problems, questions of work responsibility	68	21	11
Problems in operations development (f=157) - productivity, operations development, quality assurance, resource management	13	32	55

Discussion and Conclusions

The purpose of this study was to chart the views of social and health care professionals studying management on the tame, messy and wicked problems and the contexts of solving them in remote and in-person management. Analyzing the data yielded two main classes: problems of ethical management (49%) and the problems of operations development (51%). The data (f=3139) contained 36% tame problems, 37% messy problems and 27% wicked problems. Tame problems were focused on problems of workplace community, employee well-being and resource management. Messy problems were most clearly focused on issues of productivity, employee well-being and operations development. Wicked problems were mostly focused on problems of workplace community and operations development.

The in-person meetings of tame and wicked problems emphasized problems of ethical management, such as issues with workplace communities and employee well-being, which has also been noted in studies by Huhtala et al. (2019), Kuikka (2020) and Keiholehti (2020). In tame problems, problems of ethics also include questions of work responsibility, such as misconduct and avoiding responsibility. Earlier studies have also highlighted management problems such as recruitment and employee well-being (Nurmeksela 2021, Laaksonen and Bäckström 2022), problems in the workplace community, lacking work morale (Laaksonen 2019, Laaksonen 2017, Vartiainen et al. 2013) along with profitability and productivity (Lehto and Viitala 2016).

The respondents wanted to solve roughly 90% of all problems of ethical leadership in video or in-person meetings, which clearly shows their understanding of the challenges of ethical leadership (Huhtala et al. 2019). Hill and Bartol (2018), along with Eklund et al. (2021) suggest that ethically sensitive, confidential and disciplinary problems should be resolved in person. The respondents wanted to solve more than half of the problems related to operations development in other meetings and one third in video meetings.

The respondents suggested in-person meetings for 33% of tame problems, 38% of messy problems and 54% of wicked problems. As wicked problems are more complex and harder to identify and solve (Rittel and Webber 1973, Xiang 2013), these results are justified. Solving wicked problems in video or in-person meetings is more efficient, as other meetings may prolong and further complicate the problem.

Of all categorized meetings (f=313), in-person comprised 40%, video meetings 26% and other meetings 34%. Based on these results, hybrid management appears as 40% in-person management and 60% remote management.

The data in this study emphasized the problems of ethical management and operations development. Based on the analysis of the data, we recommend a model of hybrid management that seeks to solve problems of ethical leadership in in-person meetings and the problems of operations development remotely. These results can be used in developing hybrid leadership, work culture and workplace community training and education. Further research is needed on the practical

applications of hybrid management and the tame, messy and wicked problems of managers working on different levels.

Strengths and Limitations

The generalizability and transferability of these results may be limited by the fact that 2/3 of the respondents replied from the perspective of an employee. As tame, messy and wicked problems often involve an employee, a group of employees or another actor as one of the parties, employees' perspectives are important in solving problems in practice, which is why their participation was justified. Due to their long-term work experience, management training and in some cases management experience, the respondents had insights into managerial work and motivation to consider the assignment properly.

The reliability of the results is increased by the respondents' viewing of the instruction video and the specialist lecture before working on the group task. Before answering the tasks, the students had worked in groups for six months, making them familiar with each other and the practices of group work. Each group contained one student who worked as a manager, which ensured no group consisted only of employees. The results are certainly affected by the respondents' experience of the social and health care field and experience of managerial work. Tame, messy and wicked problems have been discussed in scientific literature from the perspectives of society, systems organizations and upper management, but rarely from that of first-line managers' workplace problems.

The data were analyzed by two researchers, which increases the study's reliability. The overall results of the study are logical in relation to earlier studies and theoretical perspectives. The results were presented to the respondents, who were asked for oral feedback on the results. The respondents felt that the results described their views, which increases the study's reliability (Tuomi and Sarajärvi 2006).

Acknowledgments

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Recent Forced Migration and Demographic Trends of Endangered Areas of Ukraine

By Monika Komušanac[*]

Recent geopolitical circumstances in the area of the eastern Ukrainian-Russian border have resulted in intense forced migrations of the Ukrainian population into and out of the territory of Ukraine. According to estimates by the United Nations and the International Organization for Migration, about 13.5 million people participated in the wave of refugees and exiles, i.e., 30% of the total population of Ukraine (May 2023). Migration movements (external and internal) caused by the war showed a distinct spatial (regional) differentiation of certain forms of forced migration with regard to the main corridors, dynamics and scale of population displacement. The largest share of war migration in Ukraine refers to refugees and asylum seekers in the European area (8.2 million), and a smaller part to the internally displaced population who replaced their pre-war residence with that in the free territories of Ukraine (5.3 million) (UNCHR, 2023). Standard analytical demographic approach was based on a list of 14 threatened areas (territories) and selected indicators of the overall and natural population movement. Selected indicators and data pointed to the negative pre-war demographic trends of the threatened areas, above all to the level of natural and total depopulation and specific regional demographic relations that are a consequence of the unevenly successful transition-reform period after independence.

Keywords: *demographic potential, forced migration, war, threatened territories, Ukraine*

Introduction

Tensions on Ukraine's eastern border with the Russian Federation have been rising since 2014, i.e., since the Ukrainian Revolution, Russia's annexation of Crimea, and pro-Russian separatist actions in the Donbass, which resulted in the gathering of Russian troops near Ukraine's eastern borders during 2021 and 2022. The escalation of the conflict occurred at the end of February 2022 with the Russian recognition of the self-proclaimed states, the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic, and three days later, on February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation's military campaign against Ukraine began. The direct demographic consequence of the Russian-Ukrainian war is the forced relocation of the population from the occupied and threatened areas to the free territories of Ukraine and increased waves of refugees to neighboring countries. Forced migrations were most intense in the first few weeks of the war, primarily due to the sudden nature of the military campaign and the fear, insecurity and life-threat faced by a large population in a very short period of time. The subject of research in this paper is to define the intensity and characteristics of the increased spatial

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mobility of the population on and outside the territory of Ukraine, with regard to the standard typology of forced migration. In accordance with the great demographic potential of Ukraine in Europe and the regional significance of the eastern Ukrainian basin, the main "pre-war" demographic characteristics of 14 endangered areas (regions) of Ukraine were singled out. The main goal of the paper is to analyze the demographic scale of Russian aggression against Ukraine, primarily the direct ones in the context of increased migration, and secondarily the long-term ones, in the context of possible revitalization after the end of the war and the stabilization of spatial, economic and social conditions in Ukraine, with regard to the inherited demographic processes of the threatened oblast (region).

Recent Refugee Waves of the Population of the Ukrainian Population

The basic criterion for distinguishing war-induced migrations is voluntariness, according to which we distinguish two basic types, forced and forced migrations. "Forced migration implies a type of migration in which the migrant does not have any decision-making ability (in the case of expulsion, implementation of the policy of ethnic cleansing, etc.), while in the case of forced migration, the migrant decides for himself whether to stay or leave" (Živić 2014, 301). It is clear that the areas in the immediate vicinity of the source of war events are the most threatened and will be most affected by some form of forced migration. UNHCR distinguishes several categories of forced migration, depending on the characteristics and territorial scope, namely; refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). "A refugee is someone who has been forced to leave their country due to persecution, war or violence, and has a well-founded fear of persecution because of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or belonging to a particular social group (UNHCR 2022a), and currently there are 27 million (UNHCR 2022b). "An internally displaced person is a person who is forced to leave his home (mainly due to internal conflicts and natural disasters) and who finds safety in nearby settlements, cities, schools, camps, etc., but who do not cross the international border. Internally displaced persons are not protected by international law because they are legally under the protection of their own government, unlike refugees", and it is estimated that there are about 51 million of them in the world (UNHCR 2022b). These two types of forced migration movements confirm the most common criterion in the typology of migration, which is spatial (territorial) distance with the difference that refugees leave the borders of a country threatened by war, while internally displaced persons are relocated from threatened areas to free territories, but within the framework of internal migration movements. Taking into account all possible limitations and shortcomings in monitoring forced migration, and above all related to the dynamics of the migration process, the impossibility of monitoring the actual scale, time gaps in data collection, increased internal and cross-border mobility, difficult monitoring of multiple relocations and the like, we still have certain data on the extent, intensity and directions of forced movements of the population of Ukraine. It should be emphasized that these are estimates and should be

considered in the context of the unstable current situation in Ukraine, and in accordance with the phases of conquest or liberation of the Ukrainian territory during which there is more pronounced mobility of the population in space.

Table 1. *Number of Registered Refugees from Ukraine in Neighboring and Other European Countries in June 2023*

Country	Number of refugees from Ukraine	Share of refugees from Ukraine (%)
Poland	1,605,738	19.45%
Russian Federation	2,852,395	34.55%
Romania	94,179	1.14%
Republic of Moldova	108,899	1.32%
Slovakia	116.718	1.41%
Hungary	36,313	0.44%
Bellarus	27,673	0.34%
Total neighbouring countries	**4,841,915**	**58.65%**
Germany	1,067,856	12.94%
Czech Republic	520,234	6.30%
Spain	177,228	2.15%
Italy	175,107	2.12%
France	118,994	1.44%
Bulgaria	51,365	0.63%
Austria	97,047	1.18%
Other european countries	**1,205,542**	**14.60%**
TOTAL UKRAINIAN REFUGEES	**8,255,288**	**100.00%**

Source: UNHCR 2023.

According to available UNHCR estimates, in the first three months after the beginning of the war, about 12.8 million people participated in forced migrations, of which the majority were those who changed their pre-war place of residence but remained in Ukraine (internally displaced persons - IDPs), about 7 .7 million, while a much smaller number, about 5.1 million, refers to refugees outside Ukraine (United Nations 2022b). According to latest data (January 2023), the number od IDPs has been continuously decreasing in Ukraine since August 2022, and currently amounts to 5.4 million (United Nations 2023). Considering the total demographic potential of Ukraine, which, according to the Demographic Yearbook from 2019, has close to 42 million inhabitants (without the annexed parts of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol) (State Statistics Service of Ukraine 2020), over 30% of the population of Ukraine participated in recent forced migrations, within and/or beyond borders since the beginning of the war. UNHCR (2023), which has been monitoring the refugee crisis since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, shows that currently (June 2023) there are about 8.3 million of its citizens outside the borders of Ukraine, of which 5.1 million are registered for temporary protection or similar national protection programs in Europe. About 21 million crossings were recorded at the border crossings of Ukraine (from Ukraine), but this data does not reflect the

movements of individuals, but all total cross-border movements, including border crossings of residents from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions immediately before the start of the war in Ukraine, as well as crossings due to the delivery of humanitarian aid help. Analyzing the directions of the refugee waves from Ukraine, the population moved from the war-affected areas of the east and southeast of Ukraine towards the borders of Ukraine in the west, northwest, and northeast.

The data from Table 1 shows that currently most Ukrainian refugees are in neighboring countries, about 4.84 million (58.65%), of which the most, over a million, are in Russian Federation (2.8 million) and Poland (1.6 million), in Slovakia (116 thousand), in Republic of Moldova (108 thousand), in Romania (94 thousand) etc. For the sake of comparison, in the first four weeks of the war, more than three million people escaped from Ukraine, almost 75% of them to neighboring Poland (1.86 million) and Romania (467 thousand) (UNHCR, 2023), which confirms the fact as the wave of refugees was most intense immediately after the start of the war, and with the advancement of the Ukrainian forces in liberating the territory and military successes, the number of "new" refugees is decreasing, while the number of those who leave their pre-war residence, but do not go beyond the borders but to free (other) territory of Ukraine. In addition to the pronounced spatial selectivity of refugee waves towards neighboring countries due to geographical proximity, movement towards individual European countries also confirms pronounced differentiation, but for other reasons. Currently, there are 1.2 milion refugees from Ukraine or 14.60% of the total number in other European countries, and a relatively significant refugee contingent is in Germany (1 milion), the Czech Republic (520 thousand), Spain (177 thousand), Italy (175 thousand), France (118 thousand) and Austria (97 thousand), where together there are currently 2.1 million Ukrainian refugees. The mentioned differentiation in the spatial distribution of refugees is in direct correlation with the size of the Ukrainian emigrant contingent from the pre-war period. The European Commission (2022) states that Poland, Italy, the Czech Republic, Germany and Spain are home to about 80% of the population that emigrated from Ukraine in the last decade, and the data in Tables 1 and 2 confirm the mentioned connection between the Ukrainian diaspora and the extent of the recent wave of refugees directed according to individual European countries. In 2019, most Ukrainian emigrants lived in Eastern Europe (67%), Southern (8.6%) and Western Europe (close to 6%), primarily in the Russian Federation (3.2 million) and Italy (246 thousand) , Germany (241 thousand), Belarus (222 thousand), Poland (218 thousand) and the Czech Republic (110 thousand), which together were the destination for 1.03 million Ukrainian emigrants (Table 2).

Table 2. *Population of Ukrainian Origin in Diaspora in 2019 According to Current Place of Residence*

Country	Total 2019	Country	Total 2019
Russian Federation	3,269,248	Czech Republic	110,337
Italy	246,367	Spain	94,120
Germany	241,486	Hungary	55,609
Belarus	222,917	Portugal	47,323
Poland	218,716	Republic of Moldova	42,548
Ukrainian diaspora in Europe 2019			**4,779,015**
Ukrainian diaspora in Eastern Europe 2019			**3,958,674**
Ukrainian diaspora in the World 2019			**5,901,067**

Source: United Nations 2019.

Internal Forced (War) Migration on the Territory of Ukraine

The aforementioned data on the consequences of the Russian attack on Ukraine showed that forced migrations in the territory of Ukraine, in relative terms, were on a larger scale than the waves of refugees from Ukraine at the beginning of the war, while now there are more refugees and returnees in Ukraine. On March 6, 2022, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine defined the spatially most threatened administrative- territorial units of Ukraine for the purpose of social assistance and support to the displaced population, i.e. it adopted the "Decision on approving the list of administrative-territorial units in whose territory assistance is provided to insured persons under eSupport Program" (Government Portal of Ukraine 2022). The Government of Ukraine has also defined a list of persons who are considered and registered as Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) for the purpose of realizing various social, financial, material, housing and other rights from the launched state support programs. Therefore, internally displaced persons are considered to be those "persons who have been relocated from war-affected areas from the list of the most endangered territories (14 and later 8 regions) and whose registered residence is outside the most endangered territories, but are registered as liable for contributions to the mandatory state social insurance or have paid the same contribution for the fourth quarter of 2021 or for the year 2021 in that "threatened" area" (Government Portal of Ukraine 2022). According to the decision of the same name, the most threatened regions (areas) of Ukraine at the beginning of March were a total of 14, and they were; Volyn, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zhytomyr, Zaporizhia, Kyiv, Lugansk, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumakha, Kharkiv, Kherson and Chernihiv regions and the City of Kyiv (Government Portal of Ukraine, 2022) According to the course and characteristics of the war and the advance and retreat of Russian forces, list of territories in which "active hostilities, i.e., areas that are occupied, besieged or blocked" are being conducted, has been revised and currently includes eight oblasts, namely certain parts of Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, Kherson and Sumakha regions. In addition to the reduction of the territorial extent of the most affected areas, there is also a noticeable spatial shift of war hotspots exclusively to the southern, eastern and southeastern regions of Ukraine, in contrast to the threatened

areas. Regardless of the number and spatial size of the separated, war-affected territories, the directions of internal migration, i.e. the movement of internally displaced persons, are primarily directed from the east and south, from directly threatened areas and those in their immediate vicinity, towards the west, north-west and south-west areas along the borders with neighboring countries, Poland, Romania, Moldova, Slovakia and Hungary. According to the list of the occupied territories, their basic spatial and demographic characteristics were singled out, which will be the basis for the assessment of direct and indirect demographic losses, not only for the threatened parts but also for the entire population of Ukraine, in accordance with their current (pre-war) demographic potential. We are also interested in the data from Table 3, which confirm the regional demographic potential of threatened areas.

Table 3. *Endangered Regions of Ukraine by Population, Area and Population Density in 2020*

Region	Surface (km²)	Population density 2020 (inhabitants per square kilometer)	Total population estimation 2020 (resident population)	Share in total (estimated) population 2020
UKRAINE	**603,665**	**76,27**	**41,418,717**	
Volyn	20,143	50,87	1,024,669	2.47%
Dnipropetrovsk	31,914	98,35	3,138,726	7.58%
Donetsk	26,517	154,14	4,087,395	9.87%
Zhytomyr	29,900	40,01	1,196,264	2.89%
Zaporizhia	27,200	61,24	1,665,726	4.02%
Kyiv	28,131	63,37	1,782,751	4.30%
Lugansk	26,684	79,33	2,116,725	5.11%
Mykolaiv	24,598	45,03	1,107,679	2.67%
Odesa	33,310	70,76	2,357,047	5.69%
Sumakha	23,834	44,11	1,051,260	2.54%
Kharkov	31,415	83,34	2,618,198	6.32%
Kherson	28,461	35,67	1,015,275	2.45%
Chernihiv	31,865	28,04	893,501	2.16%
City of Kyiv	839	3481,37	2,920,873	7.05%
Total threatened areas	**364,811**	**73,95**	**26,976,089**	**65.13%**

Source: State Statistisc Service of Ukraine 2020.

If we take into account the total territory of the areas that were most affected at the beginning of March, over 364 thousand square kilometers of Ukraine were directly threatened by war suffering, which makes up 60% of its surface, and in this area, according to estimates for the year 2021, almost 27 million people lived people or 65% of the total Ukrainian population (without annexed parts) (State Statistics Service of Ukraine 2020). It is also significant that some of the

threatened areas are the regions with the highest population in Ukraine, namely the Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk regions and the city of Kyiv, where together 10 million people or 25% of the total population of Ukraine live. The average population density of the 14 threatened areas is moderate, 76 people/square kilometer and slightly lower than the national average, and the areas with the highest population density are commensurate with the areas with the largest number of inhabitants (Kyiv City - 3,481 people/square kilometer, Donetsk region - 54 people/square kilometer, and Dnipropetrovsk region - 98 people/square kilometer), i.e. those areas that were the target of attacks in the first few days of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The extent of the threat is of course not only related to the size of the territory that was or is exposed to war suffering, but also to the destructive consequences of the war for the population and future population development, which will be discussed in the framework of the pre-war demographic characteristics of the war-affected areas. Forced migration is a direct consequence of war events and as such, manifests itself immediately after the first conflicts, and the laws of their occurrence and development follow the course of the war, while the long-term consequences will be assessed after the end of the war and the stabilization of the war situation in Ukraine. Accordingly, we can single out several legalities of internal forced migration on the territory of Ukraine, which in absolute and relative terms are more pronounced than external (refugee) migration, more complex and more difficult to monitor (register) due to the emergence of the so-called multiple relocations (deployments), increased internal spatial mobility (arrival for family members, arrival of humanitarian aid...) and internal return flows. Nevertheless, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) conducted several surveys among the local population with a monthly time lag in order to be able to compare the intensity of migration, the spatial selectivity in origin and destination, and the intention to leave and return. In addition to analytical estimates of the number of people who participated in the recent migration waves, based on the data obtained, the IOM also defined the main internal migration corridors and the legality of the regional distribution of internally displaced persons of Ukraine during the recent crisis.

Ukraine recorded a trend of increasing the number of internally displaced persons even before the Ukrainian crisis in 2022, that is, since the deterioration of Russian-Ukrainian relations and the escalation of tensions in 2014, when the Russian Federation annexed Crimea and Sevastopol, the Crimean port that had a special administrative status in Ukraine, and after self-proclamation of the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics. According to the data of the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine, there were about 1.46 million internally displaced persons in the territory of Ukraine in 2021, primarily from the temporarily occupied areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (i.e., the areas of the self-proclaimed republics), the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol (Government Portal of Ukraine 2021). The total number of internally displaced persons in those four areas was about 1.1 million, of which the largest number was in Donetsk (512 thousand) and Lugansk (282 thousand) regions (unoccupied parts), Kyiv (163 thousand) and Kharkiv (136 thousands). Some cities had large shares of internally displaced persons even before the Russian military campaign in Ukraine, for example,

Severodonetsk (44%), Mariupol (20%), Izyum (13%), Bucha (11%), Irpin (9%), Berdjansk (8%), Kyiv (5.5%) and others (CEDOS 2022). The recent events at the end of February 2022, i.e., the Russian aggression against Ukraine, intensified migration from this area in view of the source of conflicts precisely in the prominent Russian-Ukrainian border area in the east and southeast and encouraged "new" refugees and refugee proportions in a very short time, so by mid-March 2022, almost 3 million refugees from Ukraine and about 6.4 million internally displaced persons were registered (United Nations 2022a). The first displacements related to the exiled population from those areas towards the western areas along the border with Poland, Slovakia and Hungary and the central areas, and in the first three weeks of the war, the number of newly arrived internally displaced persons was particularly large in the Lviv region (200 thousand) and almost equally in Zakarpattia and Ivano-Frankivsk regions (80 thousand) and slightly less in Khmelnytskyi (about 70 thousand) (CEDOS 2022). A survey conducted by the IOM in March showed that "48% of IDPs in Ukraine left their homes after the war, 45% left their homes when the war arrived in their area, and 5% left their homes in anticipation of the conflict." (CEDOS 2022), depending on the location of the exiled population or endangered population (with still free territories) and the circumstances at the time.

Table 4. *Internal Migration Flows of the Displaced Population - According to Pre-war Place of Residence (Februrary 2022 – May 2022)*

Makroregion	% of the Total Internally Displaced Contingent	Estimation of the Number of Internally displaced Persons according to Place of Pre-war Residence
Kyiv	20.6%	1,654,000
East	49.0%	3,938,000
South	10.8%	871,000
Center	1.1%	87,000
North	16.5%	1,327,000
West	1.9%	152,000
Total	**100.00%**	**8,029,000**

Source: United Nations 2022a.

As expected, according to the same source, the most people left the eastern macro-region (2.3 million), the Kyiv region, i.e., the city of Kyiv and the Kyiv region (1.9 million) and the northern macro-region (1.3 million), and majority was placed in the western macroregion, about 2.5 million. From the beginning of the war until today, the IOM has been continuously conducting national surveys on a monthly basis in order to collect as much data as possible on the waves of exiles and refugees, and based on the results of these surveys, return flows wewrw estimated at 2.7 million (including those who returned from free/other parts of Ukraine and those who returned from abroad) (United Nations 2022a). Tables 4 and 5 show data on the size of the displaced contingent according to pre-war and current residence at the macro-regional level. The main internal migration corridor indicates leaving primarily the east of Ukraine (about 3.9 million) and Kyiv (1.6 million) and immigrating to the western regions or regions that are in the

immediate vicinity of threatened areas (to the north or to the interior) (Table 4). Using a regional approach, it was determined that the most internally displaced persons are from Kharkiv (23%), Kyiv (20%), Donetsk (17%) and Kyiv (12%) region (United Nations 2022a).

Table 5. *Internal Migration Flows of the Displaced Population - According to the Current Place of Residence (Februrary 2022 – May 2022)*

Makroregion	% of the Total Internally displaced Contingent	Estimation of the Number of Internally displaced Persons according to Current Destination
Kyiv	2.96%	238,000
East	18.33%	1,472,000
South	6.46%	519,000
Center	20.75%	1,666,000
North	15.37%	1,234,000
West	36.12%	2,900,000
Total	**100.00%**	**8,029,000**

Source: United Nations 2022a.

According to these data, almost 50% of the internally displaced contingent was from the territory of eastern Ukraine. In proportion to the absolute ratios and directions of displacement of displaced persons on the territory of Ukraine, the macro-regions where the largest number of displaced persons are located are those farthest from the war events and along the western and northern borders, and the least in directly threatened areas and those in their immediate vicinity. In other words, according to the current destination, the most internally displaced persons are located in the West and Center macro-regions, almost 4.5 million or 57% of the total displaced contingent, and the most of those who have found their current residence are in Kyiv (9), Lviv (9%), Dnipropetrovsk (8%), Khmelnytskyi (8%) and Vinnytsia (7%), while the fewest displaced persons are located in the macro-regions of Kyiv (238 thousand) and South (520 thousand) (Table 5). Such trends have persisted until today, with a gradual decline in internal migration flows in absolute terms since the summer of last year, so more recent data confirm the aforementioned relationships in smaller numbers.

Separated migration directions and main source corridors confirm the overall spatial selectivity of forced migration (both in destination and origin), existing regional differences and the importance of geographic location in the distribution of internally displaced persons. It is also important to note that as the war progressed, the number of internally displaced persons from all macro-regional origins and towards all macro-regional destinations increased, with more or less comparative (proportional) relations with the war and war operations on Ukrainian territory and recent events on the Russian-Ukrainian border. The only exception is Kyiv, where a noticeable decrease in the number of displaced persons is primarily due to more pronounced return flows, the liberation of Kyiv's territory on several occasions, but also greater exposure of Kyiv to the main humanitarian corridors. Therefore, the estimates of return flows shown in Table 6 should be considered

within the framework of changing military-political circumstances and the likely continuation of instability in the region.

Table 6. *Estimated Return Flows (Internal and External) by Macro-region of Return (January 2023)*

Return makroregion	Return estimates	Share of the return contingent (%)
Kyiv	1,400,000	25.00%
East	1,238,000	22.00%
South	95,000	10.00%
Center	359,000	9.00%
North	1,489,000	27.00%
West	520,000	6.00%
Total	**5,562,000**	**100.00%**

Source: United Nations 2023.

It is estimated that around 2.7 million people were included in return flows by May 2022, most of which refer to interregional returns (from other cities within the same region and from one region to another), almost 93%, while the smallest share is those who returned from abroad (7%) (United Nations 2022a). From that period to the present, the number of returnees to Ukraine has increased by over 50% and it is estimated that the returnee flows are at the level of 5.65 million people (United Nations 2022a, 2023). There is a significant difference, apart from the absolute one, in that as the war progressed, the number of refugee-returnees to Ukraine increased to around 1/5, and accordingly the share of interregional refugee return migrations decreased. Analysis of the direction of return shows that the most returnees are registered in the North (1.48 million) and in Kyiv (1.4 million) macro-regions, which is in accordance with the size of the current exile contingent in these macro-regions (Tables 4 and 5). The expected fewest returns were registered in the south, which is continuously the most affected by war events. Although it is evident that the return trends exist, from the current perspective it is ungrateful to forecast their scale in view of the unstable and changing war situation in Ukraine. In this context, differences were also observed in the expression of intention to leave by the population that was not directly affected by the war events (population from the free territories), at the beginning of March 2022 and at the beginning of January 2023. Namely, the number of those who thought about leaving Ukraine was the highest immediately after the start of the war and decreased over time, while the intention to relocate was stable, expressed and persistent among already displaced persons, with an increasing trend parallel to the continuation of the war.

Displacement of the population, destruction of space and social structures, human and material losses, etc. are the initial effects of the presence of war events, they manifest themselves very quickly and leave direct consequences. After the end of the war, real data on refugee, exile and returnee movements and the demographic consequences of the war for individual macro-regions and regions of Ukraine will be seen.

Demographic Trends of the War-endangered Areas of Ukraine

Given that the intensity of forced external migration was the highest immediately before the start of the war and in the first month of the war, and the intensity of forced internal migration increased with the continuation of the war, we will focus on the scale of internal migration according to the first list of 14 threatened areas (areas), while analyzing their basic demographic characteristics. The characteristics of the spatial distribution of population at the level of threatened regions were defined in the previous chapter, and here we will focus on the basic pre-war demographic trends in the area of total, natural and spatial movement of the population and regional demographic potential and resources in the context of possible post-war revitalization. Observed processes and trends are essential for understanding the prospects of future demographic development of areas threatened by war, and in accordance with general depopulation processes and the advanced second demographic transition, which is occurring equally at the national and regional levels.

According to population estimates for the year 2020, almost 27 million, or as much as 65% of the population of Ukraine, lived in threatened administrative units. The most endangered areas, in equal numbers, belong to the east and north macroregions (5 in total), the south macroregion 3, and in the west only one area had the status of endangered (Volyn). At the macro-regional level, more than 15 million people had a pre-war residence in vulnerable areas in the East of Ukraine. Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk regions in the east had the greatest potential, where 9.87% and 7.58% of the population of Ukraine lived, respectively. The overall movement of all 14 endangered areas shows distinct depopulation processes and more or less similar trends (Table 7).

The absolute change in the number of inhabitants in 2020 compared to 2019 confirms that in the pre-war year, the area lost almost 192,000 people in one year! In the same year, the whole of Ukraine lost around 314,000 people, which shows that in the pre-war depopulation processes, threatened areas make up almost 62%. The loss of population in 20 years for these areas is 10%, with the fact that in some areas the relative 20-year decline is over 20%, such as in Chernihiv and Sumakha region in the north, while only Kyiv region recorded an increase in the number of inhabitants due to positive migration trends. and the fact that it is the most developed part of Ukraine. It is interesting to analyze the natural and migration components and how they affect the overall decline in the number of inhabitants. Depopulation of Ukraine 2020/2019 was the result primarly of natural decline, which amounted to over -323,000 people, while the migration balance was positive (9,316), but with very low values for such a large population. All threatened units had a negative natural change, while only four had a positive migration balance, Kyiv region and City of Kyiv in the north, Odesa in the south, and Kharkiv region in the east (Table 7).

Table 7. *Potentials of Threatened Areas of Ukraine in the Overall Movement of the Population of Ukraine 2020/2019*

Region	Total population change 2020/2019	Relative population change 2020/2019	Total natural change 2020	Total migration balance 2020
UKRAINE	**-314,062**	**-10.05%**	**-323,378**	**9,316**
Volyn	-4,024	-3.40%	-3,896	-128
Dnipropetrovsk	-34,613	-12.02%	-33,981	-632
Donetsk	-31,528	-15.57%	-26,095	-5,433
Zhytomyr	-12,717	-13.90%	-12,061	-656
Zaporizhia	-20,886	-13.66%	-18,865	-2,021
Kyiv	7,486	-2.47%	-17,276	24,762
Lugansk	-14,591	-16.87%	-11,100	-3,491
Mykolaiv	-11,468	-12.42%	-10,132	-1,336
Odesa	-9,123	-4.54%	-14,254	5,131
Sumakha	-14,795	-19.12%	-12,969	-1,826
Kharkov	-24,627	-10.16%	-27,470	2,843
Kherson	-11,206	-13.60%	-9,407	-1,799
Chernihiv	-5,066	-28.25%	-4,543	-523
City of Kyiv	-5,180	11.85%	-5,421	241
Total threatened areas	**-192,338**	**10.50%**	**-207,470**	**15,132**

Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine 2020.

The given data confirm the level of total and natural depopulation at the national and separate spatial level, and rare examples of population growth are related to urban areas and their immigration potential. The size of the influence of the separate administrative units on the total and natural movement of the population of Ukraine is clear. Table 8 shows some other selected indicators of natural and biodynamic characteristics of threatened areas in the context of assessing the possibility of post-war revitalization, and in accordance with negative pre-war demographic trends. The classic approach to revitalization is based on the domicile population, its demographic characteristics and identity peculiarities, even in conditions of long-term population loss through natural means (Šterc and Komušanac 2012). Biodynamic features are indicators of the current natural (fertile) potential for demographic renewal in the future, so in this context, some specifics and relations will be singled out at the level of Ukraine and threatened areas. The demographic development of Ukraine during the 20th century was the result of specific actions such as "the direct and indirect effects of two world wars, the consequences of the Bolshevik Revolution, the famine of 1932/1933 connected with the collectivization of the country, mass deportations and executions of the "Great Stalin's Terror", etc. (Romaniuk and Gladun 2015, p. 315). Factors are the ones that influenced the continuation of negative demographic trends even after independence, along with the unfavorable effects of the transition process and economic instability of Ukraine after the 1990s.

Table 8. *Selected Indicators of Natural and Biodynamic Features of 14 Endangered Parts (regions) of Ukraine in 2020*

Region	Crude birth rate	Crude mortality rate	Total fertility rate	Average age	Share of population up to 15 years (%)	Share of population 60+ years (%)
UKRAINE	**7.8**	**15.9**	**1.217**	**42.1**	**16.12 %**	**24.44%**
Volyn	10.1	13.9	1.514	38.4	20.77%	19.69%
Dnipropetrovsk	6.7	17.5	1.091	42.2	16.27%	24.64%
Donetsk	...	...	…	46.2	11.91%	30.53%
Zhytomyr	7.6	17.6	1.198	41.2	17.41%	23.44%
Zaporizhia	6.3	17.5	1.030	42.9	15.37%	25.72%
Kyiv	8.0	17.6	1.184	40.4	18.48%	21.90%
Lugansk	...	...	…	47.3	10,51%	31.80%
Mykolaiv	6.9	15.9	1.106	41.9	16.28%	24.12%
Odesa	8.7	14.7	1.336	40.6	17.95%	22.46%
Sumakha	5.7	17.9	0.925	43.7	13.90%	26.55%
Kharkov	6.3	16.7	0.978	42.5	14.53%	24.59%
Kherson	7.5	16.7	1.204	41.4	17.01%	23.64%
Chernihiv	9.0	14.1	1.302	39.6	18.30%	20.86%
City of Kyiv	10.3	12.2	1,437	40.3	17,60%	21,81%

... Data not available.
Source: State Statistics Service od Ukraine 2020.

Due to these unfavorable social and economic circumstances, Ukraine went through the transitional demographic model without the expected development and creation of preconditions for the population to remain and post-war population growth. Today, Ukraine's birth rate is at a low, post-transition value of 7.8 per thousand, while the marginal drop in the birth rate below 20 per thousand occurred already at the beginning of the 1960s (Macrotrends 2022). Areas threatened by the war generally have a slightly higher birth rate than the national average (but still low), and the range ranges from 6.3 to 10.3 per thousand (Table 8). On the other hand, the mortality rates in all threatened units are higher than the birth rate, which results in a negative natural change. Mortality rates are generally very high, between 12 and almost 18 per thousand, and the causes of such a high number of deaths should be sought in continuous depopulation and aging of the population, but also in specific causes such as problems with alcoholism, risky sexual behavior, drug consumption, high suicide rates etc. (Radczenko and Michalski, 2015, 34). The most unfavorable natural trends are in the areas in the north and east of Ukraine, for example, as many as 5 out of 24 threatened areas have a mortality rate above 17 per thousand (Sumkha, Zhytomyr and Kyiv in the north and Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia in the east), and at the same time these are areas with very low birth rates, such as Suma Oblast (5.7 per thousand) and Zaporizhia (6.3 per thousand). The isolated general indicators show the level of natural depopulation in them, so the total fertility rate (TFR) is expected to be below the level required for simple population renewal (2.1 children) and at the national level is 1.22. The TFR in selected areas is below 1.6, which means that the natural renewal of the population in them has been threatened and below the required level for decades (Table 8). The worst situation is in the Sumy Oblast in

the north and Kharkiv in the east of Ukraine, where on average one woman gives birth to less than one child in the fertile period, while the situation is somewhat more favorable in the Volyn region (1.52) in the west and the City of Kyiv (1.44).

The other indicators from Table 8 also confirm mostly the same relationships and conclusions related to the demographic characteristics of threatened areas, the level of pre-war depopulation and the limited potential for demographic recovery. The analysis of the basic indicator of population aging, the ratio of the share of old and young population in separate units shows that in all units except for the Volyn region, the share of the young population (up to 15 years) is smaller than the share of the old population (+60 years). At the level of the whole of Ukraine, the difference between the share of the young and the share of the old is over 8%, unfortunately in favor of the increasing share of the old population, which in 2020 amounted to almost 25%. The alarming data is that in some areas, for example in Lugansk and Donetsk in the east, the share of young people is slightly higher than 10%, and the share of old people is above 30% Demographic aging is not less intensive in other threatened areas either, given that the average share of the old population in them is 25%, and the young 16%, and the range of values depends on the mentioned relationships and long-term trends in birth rate and mortality. Regional aging trends are also confirmed by the average age of endangered areas, which is almost equal to the national value (42.1), it is somewhat more favorable in the west and north of Ukraine (below and around 40 years), while the highest values are in the east, in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions (above 47 years).

Given the number of isolated and presented indicators that cannot be covered individually for each area, the following will highlight the basic laws, relationships and trends within the framework of (macro) regional spatial-demographic differences. The western part of Ukraine (and Volyn as the only western region on the endangered list in 2022) are recording more positive trends in overall population movements, i.e., the lowest level of overall depopulation in the last 30 years or so. The only endangered area that recorded positive trends and low rates of population growth was the City of Kyiv, primarily due to more favorable migration trends. The central, southern and eastern regions have a more pronounced decrease in the number of inhabitants, while Donetsk, Luhansk, Chernihiv and Sumakha are among the threatened areas. The trends of natural population movement are also more favorable in the western and northwestern parts of Ukraine, and this is primarily the result of higher birth rates, especially among the rural population. On the other hand, the northeastern, eastern and central parts of Ukraine (and vulnerable areas from these macro-regions) have the lowest birth rates, the highest mortality rates and the lowest average life expectancy at birth. Likewise, specific causes of death are most prevalent in these parts of Ukraine, such as high rates of suicide, high rates of HIV and AIDS infection, increased alcoholism, etc. Unfavorable trends were additionally intensified by emigration, which occurred more significantly after the slow transitional transition. on the market economy, failed reforms, but also political instability. Although more or less the whole of Ukraine is affected by emigration, it is most pronounced from the economically poorest areas, and mostly directed towards the neighboring countries in the west and east.

The main reasons for spatial differences in certain demographic processes mostly stem from socio-economic conditions and development circumstances. The transition processes of the 1990s in the economic sense mostly affected the industrial and urban areas, i.e., the northeastern, eastern and southern parts of Ukraine, caused an economic crisis and an increase in unemployment, which continuously led to a social crisis and endangerment of existence, and consequently to an increase in alcoholism, drug consumption and suicides. The long-term effects of such (un)developmental circumstances caused the highest rates of poverty precisely in the north and central parts of Ukraine, where as much as 10% of the population is on the poverty line, while the west of Ukraine and areas in the immediate vicinity of Kyiv had the lowest rates of social and material deprivation. The few regional examples of a more favorable demographic picture are closely related to the functional gravitational significance of the City of Kyiv on the surrounding (neighboring) areas, more successful transition industrial areas in the east, and relatively more favorable biodynamic features in the west of Ukraine. It should be noted that the demographic trends in the eastern Ukrainian-Russian border zone have been significantly disrupted in the last decade as a result of unstable geopolitical conditions, pro-Russian military separatist actions in 2014, and the recent military campaign against Ukraine, which resulted in large direct and indirect war losses on east and south, and in accordance with the great pre-war demographic potential of that area.

Conclusion

The direct demographic and spatial consequence of the Russian invasion of Ukraine is increased forced migration, which, according to estimates from various statistical sources, included around between 17 and 19 million people in Ukraine. The available data confirm that the wave of refugees was the largest immediately after the start of the war, and with the progress of the Ukrainian forces in liberating the territory, the number of "new" refugees is decreasing, while the number of internally displaced persons who find their post-war residence in the free (other) territories of Ukraine is increasing. The main migration corridors indicate a distinct spatial selectivity of the distribution of the population in the origin and destination, i.e. at the macro-regional, regional and border level. According to the criterion of geographical proximity, most Ukrainian refugees are in neighboring countries, about 4.84 million, primarily in Russian Federation and Poland (55%). In other European countries (those that do not border Ukraine), a relatively significant refugee contingent is located in Germany, the Czech Republic, Italy, Spain, France and Austria, which is in direct correlation with the size of the Ukrainian emigrant contingent from the pre-war period in those countries. The directions and extent of forced internal migration movements were defined based on the list of 14 endangered territories (areas) from the beginning of March. The level of demographic destruction is confirmed by the fact that almost 60% of the surface of Ukraine was affected by the war, where 65% of the Ukrainian population lived, who mostly moved from the war-affected areas to the free areas,

i.e. from the east and southeast to the west and northwest, with the fact that war increased the number of internally displaced persons from all macroregional origins and towards all macroregional destinations. Demographic analysis of endangered areas confirmed the level of total and natural depopulation at the national and isolated spatial level, and rare examples of population growth are related to individual urban centers, their functional significance and immigration potential. Unfavorable impacts of the transition process, economic and political instability after independence and other inherited demographic factors determined the level of negativity of today's dominant demographic processes and trends at the overall and regional level, and recent destructive events reduced the existing potential of post-war demographic reconstruction of Ukraine.

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On NATO's Identities and Temporalisations

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Current IR theories bring ontological and temporal complications into the IR studies due to incompatibilities between the very act of theorising and the purely intersubjective nature of the IR field. In the absence of direct correspondence of IR entities, phenomena and events in the self-standing objectivity, the IR theorising, even in contrast to social sciences, tends to become its own ontological anchor. It tends to "precede" the pre-theoretical, intersubjective, immediate givenness and to attempt to fit it to its pre-postulated axiomatic grounds, constructs and narratives, thus altering and re-shaping it. This includes narrating geneses and their imposition on post-genetically given study objects, thus ensuring the coherence of the theoretical construct yet extending the alteration toward the temporality of study objects. However, it is possible to conduct the IR study on the ground of the pre-theoretical, intersubjective immediacy of the entity, phenomenon and event in their synthetic unity, as a phenomenological inquiry. This article attempts to outline such a study on NATO, focusing on its substance (identity) and the temporality in its relationship with its immediate intersubjective environment including its transformations. In this sense, NATO's adjustment to the post-bipolarity through a double-identity and double-temporalisation setup appears to have been obstructing a new adjustment dictated by further changes in the interstate intersubjectivity. The systemic crisis created by Russia's ongoing aggression toward Ukraine, which was facilitated by this obstruction, is likely to provide it with an end as well, the form of which being dependent on how the current war ends.

Keywords: *NATO, alliance, security community, phenomenology, post-bipolarity*

Introduction

What was NATO when it was first instituted? How NATO continued to exist when the interstate environment in reference to which it came into being "radically changed"? How has it been evolving face to the even newer changes in its environment which seems to have reached to the stage of systemic crisis with the Russian invasion of Ukraine?

These questions are certainly not novelties, including the last one that is related to the ongoing war. Answering to them comprehensively requires study on and deliberation on the IR phenomena such as "alliance" and to an extent, security-community for the substance of NATO as studied entity; "international system" or "international structure" for the general framework for interstate interactions as NATO's environment. Moreover, the axiomatic ground and methodology of conducting the study is to be determined. Given the existence of a multiplicity of works on more general, axiomatic and methodological matters and

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on the specific questions about NATO, why a new study should be attempted if not for make a rather *technical* contribution to these already present works on a specific part of theirs?

The shorter answer is: Because the existing works are inherently problematic in the sense of bringing serious complications into the study of the IR entities, phenomena and events. This is not because they are prone to commit "errata" in the conduct of the IR study but, more fundamentally, because the study they define and conduct is not in accordance with the nature of the IR entities, phenomena and events.

Current IR studies reflect their own, preceding axioms, constructs, prioritisations of theoretical nature onto the study. In other words, they "theorise". They construct narratives on the specific IR entities, phenomena and events on theoretical grounds they *precedingly* build. However, the IR field presents a unique character which is not entirely fit for such an approach, contrasting not only to the sphere of positive sciences but also-and-even to that of the social sciences, from where the IR theorising imports its various theoretical grounds mainly. Positive sciences fully and social sciences significantly anchor themselves to self-standing objectivity (the latter through the objective presence of their main actors which are true individuals and their groupings). This makes, in these fields, theory's assessment against the independently accessible objectivity possible.

Yet, the IR field is purely intersubjective, including its actors/subjects, such as the State: Even true individuals like decision-makers gain such meaning with their appresentative/ representative links to purely intersubjective actors. In the IR field, the entities, phenomena and events have no immediate correspondence in the objectivity. The IR theorising's ontological overlook of intersubjectivity as the very nature of the IR field makes it exogenous to its study objects. This often results in the imposition of the preceding theory onto the givenness of the IR entity, phenomenon and event as "explanation" and "explanatory ground" of the IR theorising precedes the givenness. This exogenously brought precedence consists of axioms, theoretical constructs and genetic narratives of the entities, phenomena and events. The IR study therefore becomes, fundamentally, the act of fitting the otherwise intersubjective, immediate givenness of the IR entity, phenomenon and event into the IR theory's preceding framework. This is not only of ontological but also of temporal character as the IR theory's narrated geneses are imposed on the immediacy of the givenness, which is by nature post-genetic.

Moreover, the IR theorising propose a multiplicity of study grounds and *a priori* proposals, thus producing manifold constructs and narratives, which contradict to the *singularity* of the intersubjective, immediate, pre-theoretical givenness of the IR entity, phenomenon or the event. Due to the lack of an ontological anchor to the self-standing objectivity, this multiplicity remains under-challenged in contrast to theories within the sphere of positive *and* social sciences. The IR theory survives more easily than its "positive" or "social" counterparts, not because of its exceptional robustness but because its constructed grounds are not easily challenged by independently accessible objectivity, which simply does not exist in the IR field.

Studies related to alliance and security-community as phenomena and to NATO as entity related to them are not different in this regard. They reflect the

ontological and temporal complications of the IR theorising. These shall be referred-to in the initial part of the first section. Against this background, a proposal shall then be outlined for anchoring the study to the immediacy of the givenness itself and for proceeding toward the description of the study object's intersubjective, pre-theoretical, immediate, singular givenness in the second sub-section. This proposal shall be based on notions and tools the Husserlian phenomenology offers, with adjustments from the Heideggerian phenomenological ontology.

The second section shall deal with NATO in its given ontological states/ identities as alliance and as security-community and in its temporal states/ temporalisations in relation with the intersubjective environment of the interstate interactions in which they are given.

The first sub-section is reserved to a phenomenological description of NATO's ontological and temporal givenness within bipolarity as its genetic environment as well as in its transformation into the early phase of the post-bipolarity. Here, NATO's alliance identity and security-community *function* in its original environment as well as their change into a double-identity and double-temporalisation which made it valid and viable during the post-bipolar period will be debated. The second sub-section shall focus on inquiring NATO in relation with the transformation of the interstate environment from the earlier post-bipolarity into the current, "late" phase of it. The third sub-section shall outline NATO's current ontological and temporal challenges that are related to the said changes, as "centrifugality" and "friction", which may have reached to their critical stage with the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The Ontological Complications of the IR Theorising and the Proposal of Phenomenology

IR Theorising's dealing with the Alliance and the Security-community

The study of the phenomena of alliance and security-community has been conducted on theoretical grounds, with their complications outlined in the introduction. These complications vary in forms and degrees, depending on the particular theoretical construct that is adopted in the study.

According to the realist/structural realist approach, the alliance's –and the security-community's, however this entity is often overlooked by the realists- nature, foundation, maintenance, alteration and termination are matters of power-relations between States, the subject-nature of which is pre-recognised/assumed and the (depiction of) behaviour patterns of which is imported from microeconomy as *a prioris*. Power as substance of interstate interaction finds a specific, *a priori* definition in line with these pre-recognitions and engender further specific definitions related to it such as that of threat and of interest, The alliance as phenomenon is defined on these pre-postulated grounds, this framework of the realist/ structural realist narrative precedes the immediate, intersubjective, singular encounters with the phenomenon through the related event, and fits the encounter to the said framework (see Waltz 1979, pp. 114-128, 165-167, Morgenthau 1948,

pp. 137-157, Fedder 1968, Liska 1962, pp. 26-27, Walt 1987, pp. 17-50, Snyder 1997, Schweller 1994).

Therefore, the phenomenon of alliance appears when the sources of threat or objects of interest, expressible in terms of power and survival –also related to power, become compatible between States-actors. Compatibility/incompatibility are expressible in reference to the same concept of power-relations and fundamental behaviour patterns of a "microeconomic" agent. Here, theorising uniformises state-actors at the ontological level, on these pre-postulated grounds. The individuality of the state-actor is certainly not denied, but appears in ways that are also pre-defined, *a priori* to immediate, living encounter with singular entities, phenomena and events. Individuality is expressed through the same power-parameters, the "amount" of power accompanied by elements that influence this amount, for example geographical/ geopolitical ones. On the other hand, when this kind of reductionism becomes or threatens to become too evidently in conflict with the immediate givenness of entities, phenomena and events, the theoretical effort happens to formulate remedies to protect the construct itself –and not the givenness, which is the study object–. An interesting example to that is Waltz' differentiation between the theory of international politics and the "theory of foreign policies" –based on the actors' *internal compositions*-, which results in transferring the individualities of the state-actor to a vague sphere, effectively purifying the construct from incompatibilities (Waltz 1996).

On the same matter of alliance as phenomenon, other theoretical variants replace this ground with other pre-postulates, for example through underlining interdependence (Keohane and Nye 1989, Nye 2002, Deutsch 1957) or through adding and accentuating a self-preserving and self-promoting "institutional identity" (Keohane and Martin 1995, Keohane 1988, Wallander and Keohane 1995), producing different narratives with similar effects.

The constructivist line of thought, however, amplifies the ontological complications of the IR theorising, ironically due to its more rigorous "ontological effort". Intersubjectivity constitutes the fundamental diagnosis of constructivism as regards the nature of the IR field -however the term itself is not often employed- (see Onuf 1989, pp. 35-64, Onuf 2013, pp. 3-20, Wendt 1999) and replaces the postulates of realist/structural realist approaches which *do not exclude assumptions*, for example, of the subject-character of the State and its general uniformisation within a "system" that is defined on the ground of interconnected parameters that are mentioned above (Waltz 1979). Whereas the realist assumptions –in the sense of assuming the validity of what is immediately, pre-theoretically given- create a possibility of partial reconciliation between the intersubjective, immediate, singular, pre-theoretical givenness of the IR entity, phenomenon or event and the theoretical construct, the constructivist ontology works against it. The constructivist intersubjectivity, instead of being itself the study ground of the IR entities, phenomena and events, becomes the object of a preceding theoretical ground and ensuing genetic narrative, therefore subject to ontological complications at a very fundamental level. This preceding "genetic" ground mainly consists of proposals of sociology/socio-psychology, norms and discourse analyses and so on, exogenous to the *given*, lived, immediate intersubjectivity of the IR entities, phenomena and

events. Wendt's "thin constructivism" also constitutes, in this context, an attempt to remedy this radical nature of constructivism's ontological intervention to the benefit of what is given, for example when drawing attention to "legitimacy" of referring to a constructed entity (the State) as "actor" (see Wendt 1999, pp. 193-245). However and even there, the study concentrates on social dynamics in their construction of their object, therefore only partially "thinning" the ontological intervention of constructivism which is always present and effective.

Constructivism's amplification of the IR theorising's ontological complications is more visible in its dealing with the concept of security community, which is – almost- a direct product of its understanding of the IR. In fact, the genesis and the continuation of a security community may also be "explained" on the ground of realist/structural realist or liberal understanding of international relations. Still, the constructivist work in general sense comes forward in the study of the security community, by *narrating ontology* in contrast to the reductive/assumptive approach of the realist/structural realist thought (see Wendt 1999, pp. 201-233, Kratochwil 2011, p. 161, Kratochwil 1989, pp. 24-25, Kratochwil 2011a, Adler and Greve 2009, Kratochwil 2018, Pouliot 2008, Adler 2008). Here, the narrated ontology's parameters vary from language/ discourse to culture/norms/values, social practise and so on, practically depending on the researcher's "axiomatic preferences". In any case, the study presents a genetic character, not only displaying the security community's social construction/coming-into-being but also constructing the security community (or alliance) itself.

It is not easy to state that the existing "anti-narrative" attitude in the IR field resolves the ontological complications of the IR theorising either. The post-structuralist understanding has apparently its own *a priori*, pre-determinedly critical –sometimes almost moral- position in deconstructing the narrative, with the result of building an alternative one, with complications of the same nature. The post-structuralist approaches do not take only the "criticised" narrative but also the givenness that the narrative relates itself to, as malleable material of the de-centering/ deconstruction (see for example Teorell 2018, pp. 218-232, Ashley 1984, Ashley 1996, Der Derian 2009, pp. 43-62, Bartelson 1995). Here the "metanarrative" is dismantled *directionally*, in pursuance of an "aim" rather than research, on the grounds of pre-determined, pre-selected, in fact pre-judged concepts such as sovereignty, freedom, oppression, pluralism and so on.

A Phenomenological Proposal

The current IR studies' approach to IR entities, phenomena and events is fundamentally "genetic" not only in the sense of privileging their coming-into-being over their post-genetic immediacy of givenness but also of re-shaping them in order to fit them, through narrative, into the theoretical framework that is precedingly built on grounds that are basically exogenous to the IR sphere.

Then how one may define a way of studying the IR, which would be "immune" to IR theorising's ontological complications? Are there concepts and a method that would permit to approach, without a pre-made axiomatic and genetic background, to the entity, phenomenon and event as they are given pre-theoretically,

immediately, intersubjectively, singularly, yet also in its intersubjectively meaningful unity of givenness, both as to its substance and its temporal states (as to its past, present and anticipated/contingent future)?

Phenomenology offers useful concepts and tools in this regard. The *reductions* may be applied in this direction and serve to reach to the entity, phenomenon and event "as is", as given, as appears pre-theoretically, immediately yet meaningfully, putting into perspective all "altering" act and preceding content, may they be of predicative, doxic, emotional and most importantly, theoretical nature (Husserl 1982, pp. 71-81, Husserl 1983, pp. 57-59, 220-221, Brainard 2002, pp. 68-74). In other words, within the purely intersubjective sphere of the IR, the entity's, phenomenon's, event's own, pre-theoretical, intersubjective givenness may be discerned in putting these *a priori* constructs and their *a posteriori* contents into brackets.

The more general type of reduction, the universal/phenomenological one, aims at putting into perspective the *attitude* of the subject/observer/researcher in its relationship with the "world", more precisely with the object of its attention/ object with becomes defined rather in line with the author's own axioms and theoretical construct and thus not on what is given pre-theoretically. It thus shows and labels the doxic, emotional, predicative and more importantly for our work, theoretical/genetic aspects of the grasp of the study object (Husserl 1983, pp. 51-55, Luft 1983). As such, the universal reduction itself constitutes a particular attitude for the researcher, as rather "introspective" phenomenological attitude, in contrast to what Husserl calls the "natural attitude" to which the theoretical/genetic acts belong. The phenomenological attitude constitutes the methodological ground of this study proposal. However, the focus on the study object at hand, NATO as entity and alliance/security-community as phenomena it is related-to, requires the *eidetic reduction* as it directly involves the study object as it is intersubjectively given and not solely the subject's act of grasping it. This reduction bears upon the experience of *something* as its "*generic way of presenting itself, its Erscheinen*" (see Taminiaux 1988, p. 62). The bracketing here would mean putting into perspective any preceding theoretical/genetic construct and any judgement and predication that are issue of it.

Here the eidetic reduction to NATO as entity gives neither a temporally "frozen" picture at its immediacy nor an isolated appearance of some substance/ content, but a meaningful whole which is ontologically bound to phenomena as meaning-grounds as well as to a past, present and (contingent/anticipated) future, forming a synthetic unity. The *appresentation* depicts the link between the elements of this synthetic unity, be they of ontological or temporal nature. The eidetic reduction gives these elements as irreducibles, which are bound to each other appresentatively. This also means that in case the eidetic reduction shows some element as reducible to a theoretical proposal/judgment/predication, therefore to something exogenous to the givenness, it is bracketed/put into perspective as such. The appresentative links make the synthetic unity of the study object on its *own* ground of appearance/ givenness.

The study object's given synthetic unity is individual and generic at the same time, due to the appresentative link between the phenomenon and the entity/event.

The event or entity appresents phenomenon as their meaning ground, which is of central importance to our study. In a purely intersubjective field, meaningfulness is not a contingent feature of an appearance but the very condition of its possibility, since the appearance is nothing but a meaning there since it has no direct correspondence/ presence in the objectivity. Phenomenon becomes individualised in its synthetic unity with entity or event and forms a singular, intersubjective, immediate, pre-theoretical givenness. Entity or event appears meaningfully on the "generic" ground of the phenomenon in the synthetic unity. The eidetic reduction therefore gives the study object's phenomenal/generic and individual aspects as its substance, while putting into perspective the ontologically and temporally exogenous reflective/ theoretical interventions to it.

As to temporality, the eidetic reduction gives the study object in a temporal coherence of its past, present and future that are appresentatively linked to each other. The Husserlian concepts of retention-protention, recollection and anticipation are particularly expressive in this context, yet not without their own –remediable-complications. Retention-protention expresses the grasp of the study object's *actuality* (see Husserl 1964, pp. 39-50, Kortooms 2002, pp. 177-179, Rodemeyer 2006, pp. 73-176). The present-as-moment is the temporal equivalent of a dimensionless "dot" and as such, is not given to experience in isolation. The present (of something, including the experiencing subject itself) is a *continuing* moment, which becomes possible in its unity with the immediate past and immediately upcoming future, the former in its retention and the latter in its protention (Carr 1991, pp. 24, 40-45), which appresent each other. Still this progressive "now" extends further into its past and its future. Husserl uses the terms of recollection and anticipation for these extensions (Marion 1998, pp. 77-97, Carr 1991, p. 24, Rodemeyer 2006, pp. 12-13) yet reduces both to the volitional act of the subject and not to the givenness of the "object" itself, thus separating the subject from the study object quite *unfittingly* to his own phenomenology. Here, Heidegger's temporality terms (*extases*) of having-been (with), dwelling-with and to be-with (Heidegger 1982, pp. 266-267, Heidegger 1996, pp. 111-112, Heidegger 1985, pp. 238-239) better expresses the inseparability and non-precedence to each other of the *intentio* and *intentum*, of the subject-act and the givenness. Also, in the case of the relationship between recollection and retention, Bernet's inquiry on their separability/ inseparability is of note (Bernet 1994, p. 248). Furthermore, we need to reiterate here that the intersubjective givenness is ontologically separated from volition, here as related to recollection and anticipation: Presenting the access to the temporal states of the study object as volitional is equivalent to reproducing the theoretical/ genetic approach which is exogenous to givenness. This exogeneity is displayed through the eidetic reduction of the study object which includes volition in temporalisation, as it leads to a narrative and a construct about the object rather than to its givenness. On the other hand, the eidetic reduction which puts into brackets "volition" as a narrative element displays directly and automatically the immediate and unifying appresentative nature of the relationship between the temporal states of the givenness, which integrates them to each other, the recollection to the retentional "now" and vice-versa, the anticipation to the protentional "now" and vice-versa.

Now, the entity that constitutes the study object is NATO and its ontological ground is given through the phenomena of alliance and security-community, which may both be reduced to two forms of interaction with a collectively defined Otherness. Otherness is immediately apparent as regards the phenomenon of alliance, since it more often than not takes a dialectical form. As regards the security-community which involves preventing confrontation *among* its members, the dialectic and therefore the Otherness is vague and potential, rather than immediate. This is consequently undermentioned in the security community literature but not entirely ignored, as it is inherent to, constitutive to the ground phenomenon of interaction according to which the security-community as phenomenon and as given entity becomes possible (see Bellamy 2004, pp. 31-39, 52-63, Adler and Greve 2009, Neumann 1999, pp. 207-228). However, the problem with the security-community theorising appears as Otherness does not clearly taken into consideration in approaching to the phenomenon and the entity, as theory tends to formulate a "they-less We" as community, a quite clear ontological complication. However, the eidetic reduction gives the Other/the relationship with the Other appresentatively as part of the synthetic unity of this paper's specific study object.

Lastly, the intersubjectivity/intersubjective environment reference is necessarily inherent to the synthetic unity/meaningful appearance of the entity/phenomenon/ event that is being studied. As such, it may neither be amorphous –therefore without appearance and meaning- nor a theoretical construct/narrative (since it would be reduced to exogenous genetic proposals and not to the immediacy of the givenness). Therefore it needs to be a collective reference to the (IR) intersubjectivity. Given the context of this paper, such a reference is equivalent to the general appearance of the shape of the interstate interactions, to the pre-theoretical, immediate, collective knowledge of the common environment of the IR, which is equivalent to true subjects' collective knowledge of the fundamental parameters of their common world. Here, the structural realist polarity terminology appears to be useful to express that referentiality. The said reference equates in fact to Waltz's understanding of the "international structure", but at a pre-theoretical, immediate level. Structural realism's *assumptive* character, as mentioned before, makes the theoretical construct/explanatory narrative, therefore the exogenous content, *a posteriori* to given referentiality, therefore unable to alter it.

NATO's Ontological and Temporal States

NATO as Alliance and as Security-Community during the Bipolarity and the Earlier Post-bipolarity

NATO's coming-into-being is related to the intersubjective *reference* to bipolarity as the defining character of the interstate interactions. Until the emergence of bipolarity-as-reference at the end of the IInd World War, the said reference consisted of the intersubjective recognisance of a multiplicity and relative equivalence of major actors with flexible alignment practises, expressible as multipolarity (Waltz 1979, pp. 129-130). This included bi-polarisation as a

contingent form of multipolarity, in contrast to bipolarity, which proved to be issue of a different reference (Waltz 1979, pp. 167-168, De Keersmaeker 2018, p. 16-21). Bipolarity's uniqueness consisted of the Otherness' gaining a rigid and precise content in radical contrast to the alignment flexibility that characterised the preceding multipolar intersubjectivity, including bipolarisation. The Other of bipolarity, as a precise/ concrete entity, appeared to be inherent to the very reference to the intersubjectivity of interstate interactions instead of being an identity flexibly attributed to such and such entity *within* and as *issue* of multipolarity. In other words, bipolarity appeared as the intersubjective reference to a central *dialectic* of two precise actors (see Sayle 2019, pp. 1-17, Waltz 1979, pp. 168, 170-173).

On this referential ground, *collective defence* as immediate and fundamental form of relationship with the precise, concrete "Other" engendered a non-flexible form of alliance that would be coherent with the nature of the interstate intersubjectivity. NATO (as is the case for the Warsaw Pact) was established as such an alliance entity that referred to/was reducible to bipolarity. The constituent-Other, the dialectical counterpart of what NATO represented, was precisely the USSR and its dependencies in line with the very substance of bipolarity. NATO appeared (was established) meaningfully on the ground of the specificity, anticipated continuity and nature of relationship with *this* Other, which presented a synthetic unity with the bipolarity-reference, which made the bipolarity-reference possible as such. Thus NATO radically differed from the multipolar-era alliances, which were much less rigid and far from constituting entities themselves due to the flexible nature of multipolar alignment.

Moreover, as issue of its fundamental rigidity and precision as alliance established in reference to bipolarity, NATO displayed a *function* of security-community as well, in the sense of the mitigation of confrontations and the maintenance of peace among members. The term function expresses here the precedence of the phenomenon of alliance to the phenomenon of security-community in the case of NATO, in the ontological sense. The "alliance" here refers to bipolarity and "security-community" stems from the "alliance", not directly of bipolarity, therefore comes-into-being as alliance's function. As a function of something else, NATO-as-security community differed from the security-communities of the multipolarity, like the Concert of Europe or the League of Nations, which were not built upon or preceded by an alliance. Moreover, being issue of the alliance and not directly of the member States, the security-community function protected the alliance first and foremost, by protecting peace and harmony among its members. Here it is of note that in term of efficiency, NATO's security-community function, engendered and ensured by its preceding, rigid, bipolar-type alliance identity, appeared to be much more than proper security-communities of the multipolar era (see also Waltz 1964 and Snyder 1984). Among the examples to the said efficiency, one may cite the Suez Crisis (Nichols 2011) or the Greco-Turkish confrontations on the Cyprus and the Aegean demarcation issues, which were kept from deteriorating into fractures and confrontations among allies, thus jeopardising the alliance (also see Eznack 2012).

NATO's genesis appresents the passage from multipolarity to bipolarity, as transformation in the interstate intersubjectivity which made the appearance of NATO valid and meaningful. This appresentation includes the anticipation of the bipolar dialectic's *not* being a temporary phenomenon, and as such its continuation of enabling NATO as it was. (See also Webber et al. 2012, pp. 1-20) Here NATO's anticipatory horizon would consist of contingent forms that the said central dialectic might take, like cold war-proper or *détente*. However the very existence of the dialectic appresented, *ipso facto*, its own end, invalidation as contingency, it would be equivalent to the disappearance of NATO's meaningful existence, again due to the irreducibility of the dialectic in NATO's givenness. In other words, NATO and the bipolar dialectic were mutually inherent, constituting the irreducible elements of each other.

And yet, the USSR and its alliance network disintegrated. The successor of the USSR materially emerged with loss of allies and territory, of political-economic stability and with military degradation in comparison to its predecessor (see Herspring 1995, Tikhomirov 2000). Still, the material change of NATO's dialectical counterpart did not equate to the automatic invalidation of the *material grounds* of the dialectic itself: It is hardly possible to state that the USSR's successor was not "powerful enough" to materially maintain the dialectic in place as the valid intersubjective reference of interstate interactions. This "objectivity" in terms of power-relations seems to have confused for example Waltz, as he drew attention to the preservation of Moscow's largely intact nuclear (and even conventional) power-base and depicted the situation rather as the continuation of bipolarity in a newer form (Waltz 1993). Others who theorised on the ground of power-relations seems to have omitted this argument and put forward others that were more fitting to the preceding construct selectively, for being able to declare a structural realist type of unipolarity (see Krauthammer 1991, Wohlforth 1999).

It seems that the bipolar dialectic's disappearance, while naturally being related to it as well, does not totally reflect the transformation of the balance of power. Beyond what the material transformation dictated, the Russian Federation herself positively/validatingly referred to the unipolar "givenness", as observed in her discourse and policies of democratisation, economic liberalisation and in her display of willingness to adhere to "Western" institutions (Tsygankov 2016, pp. 59-96, Melville 2018, Rumer 2007). Russia's very *identity* and not *power*, as the precise and constituent "Other" for NATO, disappeared. In other words, the bipolar dialectic was intersubjectively invalidated beyond the material criteria required by the related IR theorising.

As to NATO, the end of the bipolarity *apparently* meant an ontological impasse and a temporal destabilisation related to it. Much doubt was expressed as to the viability of the NATO at the time of the transition (Mearsheimer 1990). Still NATO was not annulled or reduced to an institutional "husk". Here the application of the narrative of institutional self-preservation to NATO would be valid in the latter case, if the entity's ontological ground was truly suppressed. Instead, institutional reflexes appeared to be rather *auxiliary* to main ontological and temporal facts (see also Walt 1997, de Wijk 1997 and Goldgeiger 1998).

Perhaps NATO's "viability problem" was after all an illusion of the IR theorising, unattached to its intersubjective, immediate, pre-theoretical givenness, an illusion stemming from the omission of the *temporal features* of the passage into post-bipolarity. The givenness of the transformation, of the invalidation of the bipolarity's central dialectic, was actual (retentional-protentional). The actuality did not/ had no reason to equate to the total "erasure" of bipolarity reference from every temporal state of interstate interaction related to NATO. The bipolar dialectic was retained in the intersubjective reference to the interstate environment and therefore within the synthetic unity of the entity, in the form of *invalidation in the actuality*, yet as something which had been valid and which presented the contingency of becoming valid on the anticipatory horizon. This stems from the appearance of the post-bipolarity itself as a sort of "non-bipolarity" instead of a self-standing, independently given reference –in contrast to multipolarity or bipolarity itself when they were actual. As such the post-bipolarity included the bipolarity-reference in its synthetic unity, *ipso facto* in NATO's synthetic unity in its relationship with the international environment. As such, it is not surprising to witness the long debate about the existence/inexistence, nature and durability of the "unipolarity" (Ikenberry et al. 2011, pp. 1-32, Jervis 2009, Beckley 2018, Pape 2009, Monteiro 2014, Mearsheimer 2018, Brooks and Wohlforth 2011, Layne 2012), as unipolarity was not pre-theoretically, immediately, singularly, intersubjectively self-evident and identifiable. The post-bipolarity, not having taken an independent shape of its own, remained ontologically and temporally linked to bipolarity and entities that referred to bipolarity, such as NATO, found their ontological viability on that ground, with changing "temporalisations".

Still, the transition itself meant the actual diminishment of the USSR's successor's bipolar identity, with the apparent and even pioneering consent of the Russian Federation herself, as displayed by a multitude of occurrences in the "West"-Russia relations as depicted above. However, it also appeared that, again in accordance with the same ontological/ temporal state-of-affairs, the identity of the bipolar-Other was *partially* transferred to Moscow within the transition into the post-bipolarity, even as the very condition of possibility of such transition. This may be exemplified by the preservation of the *liberum veto* in the UN Security Council, of Moscow's bipolarity-like counterpart status in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europ[1] and of bipolar-like *balance* and *reciprocity* norms and practises in the field of nuclear arms.

In other words, the transition would warrant neither the suppression of NATO's reason of being nor the preservation of its identity and temporalisation as it had been when bipolarity was actual. Apparently, from this impasse stemmed the re-temporalisation of NATO in two temporally separated identities, one appearing at the living actuality and one temporalised on the anticipatory horizon of contingencies. The original alliance as identity was intersubjectively attributed to the anticipatory horizon, thus preserving its contents such as the Article V or the joint command structure. As to actuality, NATO's security-community *function* seems to have emerged as identity in a *sui generis* form (Adler and Greve 2009, Williams and

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[1]https://www.osce.org/library/14087?download=true.

Neumann 2000). These two identities coexisted in their temporal separation (see also Adler and Greve 2009, Morgan 2003, Wallander 2000).

Accordingly, the "Otherness" element of the NATO's synthetic unity gained a dual identity and temporalisation, which also made NATO's new security-commutity identity *sui generis*: A security community-with-"Other" constituted the actual part of NATO with "Otherness" being identified among the asymmetrical "new threats" ranging from the terrorist groups and organised crime to the "rogue states" (see Webber et al. 2012, pp. 27-28 for the Strategic Concepts of 1991, 1999 and 2010). If these new threats were not themselves novelties, they nevertheless became valid "Others" that completed and validated the sui generis security-community identity of NATO's actuality (see also Adler and Barnett 1998, pp. 30-34, Mitzen 2016, Moustakis and German 2009, pp. 21-26). NATO's secondary function during bipolarity thus appeared as its identity in the actual post-bipolarity. Having been originally designed against exogenous threats, NATO's established structures and capabilities could fit in this *sui generis* security-community identity with adaptations, while it continued to be viable as regards the alliance identity which was temporalised on the anticipatory horizon (also see Kay and Petersson 2014). Adaptation to the *sui generis* security-community identity included revisions of doctrine and capabilities that were built for bipolarity (Da Mota 2018, pp. 146-149, Webber et al. 2012, pp. 22-30, 153-159), not without problems between the US and the EU-members or even between the Europeans themselves, for example in relation with burden-sharing (Terriff 2013). Still, NATO could act on more than one occasion as *sui generis*, outwardly (having its own Others) security-community (Burton 2018, pp. 62-74 for the Kosovo and 113-123 for the Afghanistan interventions). It is of note that the sole recourse to the Article V in the history of NATO occurred after the 9/11 attacks, as a *sui-generis* security-community act (Webber et al. 2012).

As to Moscow's otherness that was placed on NATO's anticipatory horizon, it is of note that Russia also gradually tended to refer to herself as such, again partially and as temporalised on a similar anticipatory horizon (see Prizel 1998, pp. 239-299, Gardner 2013, pp. 51-71). This took different forms, contents and discursive rationalisations (see O'Loughlin et al. 2017), which may be exemplified by the efforts to deepen the CIS or the invention of the "near-abroad" *in reference to* Russia-"West" relations (see also Selden 2016, p. 105). The tendency toward being/becoming the counterpart of the West *en bloc* was also expressed in the fundamental policy papers of the Federation (Melville and Shakhleina 2005[2]). However, the CIS' debatable progress and efficiency (see Torjesen 2009, p. 154, Vinokurov 2007 but also Willerton and Beznosov 2007) or the practical limits of the Russian involvement in the separatist near-abroad crises (see Jackson 2003, pp. 81-111, 112-139, Kennedy 2016, Lemay-Hebert 2008) apparently retrained this tendency in the-then actuality and extended it toward an anticipatory horizon of its own.

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[2]For the texts of the Foreign Policy Concept, Military Doctrine and National Security Concept until then.

As result, NATO's post-bipolar dual-identity and dual-temporalisation depended, in particular, on the Russian Federation's non-confrontational, non-dialectical stance at the-then actuality, as well as its Otherness on the anticipatory horizon,

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At that point, the outwardliness of NATO's security community identity seems also to have undermined this ontological and temporal state-of-affairs of post-bipolarity. Being at first glance *sui-generis* security community policies, the NATO enlargement with its normative contents (Epstein 2005) and NATO members' "unipolar/unilateral" interventions seem to have constituted the main factors of a gradual destabilisation. These acts could also be interpreted as those of a well-defined Alliance, in particular by Moscow in its own identification and temporalisation that was parallel to NATO's.

NATO's waves of enlargement toward Eastern Europe and into Baltics held Russia at a distance, both in terms of consultation or Moscow's invitation into the process (see Simon 2008, pp. 93, 102-103). From the very early phases of the post-bipolarity, for example within the PfP, different outcomes for different actors seem to have been pre-posited, ranging from NATO membership to promotion of democratic/economic reforms, which were generally embraced by the member countries as means of balancing Russia with the West (see Adler and Greve 2009, Cottey 2018, pp. 61-65 but also Schimmelfennig 2003, Adler 2008 and Acharya 2004). For the Russian Federation, the PfP practically became a mechanism for pacification and limited cooperation. This function was further reinforced by a bilateral mechanism of inconsequential dialogue[3].

This apparently contradicted with Moscow's understanding of continuation of the non-dialectical relationship with the West, which required an "equal say" or *de facto* "veto right" in the matters of the near-abroad, in particular as regards the NATO enlargements (see Smith 2003, Smith 2006, Light 2009). The contradiction was extended to NATO interventions in Kosovo and later in Libya, which Russia categorically labelled as unilateral and illegitimate (see Petro 2017, Norris 2005). The Russian criticism, in reduced form, appears to have been on NATO's acting as a bipolarity-era alliance within the actuality of the security-community context (also see Braun 2008). "Legitimacy" controversially meant here consensus for such interventions in the UN Security Council (and the OSCE), itself a mechanism of bipolarity-era and setup, where Moscow had its (bipolarity-inherited) equal counterpart position (see Williams and Neumann 2000, German 2017).

Russia gradually reacted more substantially. A staged yet heavy-handed centralisation policy from the end of the millennium onward increased her inner coherence (see for example Selden 2016, pp. 102-107) in contradiction with her policies of normative adherence to the West immediately after the transition into post-bipolarity. The public opinion evolved, in parallel to the centralisation and economic recovery fuelled by rising oil/gas prices, toward a bipolarity-like anti-Westernism (see Rumer 2007, Petro 2018). Russia approached more and more to a dialectical position with NATO due to the inevitably "outwardly" nature of NATO's

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[3]The NATO-Russia Founding Act and then the NATO-Russia Council.

security-community policies. In this vein, the colour revolutions of 2003-2004 and then the GUAM initiative seem to have been the last pro-western occurrences in the near-abroad that did not face direct and substantial reaction from the Russian side.

Putin's famous warning addressed to the NATO-members at the 2007 Munich Security Conference arguably marks a turning point[4]. It signified Russia's adoption of a bipolar-like, confrontational posture *in actuality*, with consequences on NATO's dual-identity and dual-temporalisation. It seems to have significantly influenced the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit, when NATO members failed to reach a consensus in granting MAPs to Georgia and Ukraine (Arbuthnot 2008). NATO's actual security-community state's failure to "riposte" apparently encouraged Moscow to take further action the same year. As the NATO-aspirant Georgia intervened in the separatist region of South Ossetia, Russia directly took part in the conflict and defeated the Georgian forces. The NATO-*members*' reaction to the Russian intervention remained discursive, therefore inconsequential. In fact, the Russian act seems to have deterred NATO from the enlargement toward the "near-abroad" as the MAPs were to be rediscussed and possibly granted the same year, which did not happen (Kipiani 2015, Antonenko 2009). Moreover, the US initiated "Reset" with Russia in 2009, which appeared as *appeasement* in the light of the 2007 and 2008 developments (Hahn 2013, Lazarević 2009).

NATO's and its members' reaction to the Russian moves indicate reflexes aiming at re-adapting Russia to their double-identity and double-temporalisation rather than re-adapting themselves to Russia's increasingly bipolarity-like self-assertion. However, even the "Reset"s *positive* outcomes such as the facilitation of the new START or of the "coordination" in the Afghanistan operation (Deyermond 2013) seem to have reinforced the Russian understanding of being a *de facto* bipolar-type "equal counterpart" in actuality and of having preponderance in its "near-abroad".

Here if the latter part of the emerging state-of-affairs between NATO and its members on the one hand and Russia on the other was correct at the *regional* level, it did not extend beyond it toward globality, as was the case during the bipolarity. This was displayed when the "West" supported the "Arab Spring" in 2010 and NATO "unilaterally" intervened in Libya in 2011, which collapsed the Reset's apparent makeshift compromise (Perra 2016, Dannreuther 2015, O'Sullivan 2018) and continued the erosion of NATO's double-identification and temporalisation.

The Ukrainian crisis of 2014 constituted another milestone in the process. Ukraine had long been a theatre of friction between two demographically/ linguistically *balanced* factions with pro-Western and pro-Russian inclinations (Van den Pijl 2018, pp. 38-41, Simon 2010, Wydra 2014). The friction had not caused disintegration, apparently due to the Russian pre-2007 and then to NATO's (and the EU's) post-2007 self-restraint. Yet the dissociation between the two sides as to their identifications and temporalisations in their relationship, as the Reset's collapse not only strongly indicated but also accelerated, seems to have brought the Ukrainian friction to a course of eruption. However the NATO MAP issue was frozen, the seemingly lesser yet meaningful issue of the choice between the EU

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[4]http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034.

Association Agreement and EAEU membership triggered the events. The Yanukovich government opted for the EAEU, the ensuing Euromaidan uprising suppressed the Yanukovich government. Russia immediately intervened in Lugansk and Donetsk and annexed Crimea in furtherance of her post-2007 course of action (see Kalb 2015, pp. 158-179, Van den Pijl 2018, pp. 69-86).

NATO *members* did react this time, not repeating the attempt to accommodate Russia to their self-identification and temporalisation through "appeasement", yet not entirely accommodating themselves to the emerging dialectic in the actuality either (also see Gardner 2016). Alliance identity began to be re-temporalised to the actuality, yet not entirely replacing the *sui generis* security-community identity and temporalisation. NATO tried, voluntarily or involuntarily, to "co-temporalise" two different identities.

In line with the abovementioned, the consecutive NATO Summits of Wales 2014, Warsaw 2016 and Brussels 2018 re-actualised the mothballed-looking concepts and measures of collective defence (see Burton 2018, pp. 156-166, Larsen 2019). NATO took some initiatives regarding the force readiness and deployment, such as the Readiness Action Plan of the Wales Summit, the "enhanced security measures" with a "focus on the Eastern Flank", the "renewed emphasis on deterrence and collective defence" and the "reliance to US forces" of the Warsaw Summit as well as the conventional deterrence commitment "30/30/30 over 30" of the Brussels Summit (Larsen 2019, Heisbourg 2020, Ringsmose and Rynning 2017). Some additional measures were taken in the field of nuclear deterrence as well (see Larsen 2019). Still, face to Russia's rapid military modernisation programme, the reinforcement of the NATO-members on their contact-zones remained feeble (Giles 2017, Petersson 2019). The issue of granting MAPs to Ukraine and Georgia, already a matter of strong inner divergences, disappeared in the background, apparently *because* they had been targeted by Russia (Lanoszka 2017). The efficiency of the NATO-members' sanctions against Russia proved to be at best limited (see Kholodilin and Netšunajev 2019), also diminished by divergences among NATO-members (Stahl et al. 2016). Even the "spillover" of the Russian military activity toward the conflict zones of the Middle East, into Syria most prominently but also into Libya, could not be deterred. On the other hand, Russia's self re-temporalisation to a bipolar-like relationship with NATO and its members went on and was reflected increasingly in its official discourse[5].

Centrifugality and Friction: NATO's and its Members' Impasses in the Late Post-Bipolarity and the Ukrainian War

NATO's/NATO-members' apparent delay in re-identifying/ re-temporalising the entity face to obvious changes in the post-bipolar environment may be reduced to two mutually appresenting phenomena, expressible as centrifugality and friction. Centrifugality appears as regards the NATO-members' lack of unity in determining and pursuing policies related to the entity, which stems from post-bipolarity's

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[5]https://russiaeu.ru/userfiles/file/foreign_policy_concept_english.pdf; https://carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf; https://www.rusemb.org.uk/in1/; https://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029; https://www.rusemb.org.uk/rp_insight/.

flexibility in contrast to the characteristic alignment discipline of the bipolar era. NATO's double-identification and double-temporalisation, in particular the adoption of the characteristically supple *sui generis* security-community identity in the post-bipolar "actuality", validates centrifugality at ontological level. Subsequently, the phenomenon of friction appears between the two NATO identities as the alliance was being re-temporalised in the actuality, where the *sui generis* security-community is already temporalised, in connection with the centrifugal policies of the individual NATO members (also see Waltz 2000, de Wijk 1997, Garey 2020, pp. 6-7).

The passage to the post-bipolarity had widened the state-actors' policy horizons, including these of the NATO-members, *relative* to the rigid bipolar dialectic, when common action was being debated. The *sui generis* security-community as the "actual" post-bipolar NATO identity amplified centrifugality as its reference to "Otherness" was blurred in comparison with the bipolar-type alliance. As such, NATO's or NATO-members' interventions, in planning and in implementation, presented inner disconcert at varying levels (see Sperling 2019, also Bellamy 2002). This phenomenon appeared also in NATO's enlargement process, despite the fact that enlargement proved to be more practicable/justifiable as that of a security-community (also see Adler 2008, Wallander 2000). Even as such, Russia's increasing tendency to retain her bipolar-identity in living actuality seems to have further amplified centrifugality within NATO, differentiating more "cautious" members from the others. France's and Germany's blockage of Georgian and Ukrainian MAPs constituted a particularly consequential event which exemplified the phenomenon. Among the subsequent examples, once may cite the inconsistent sanctioning of Russia and the weak support to Kiev, Tbilissi and Kishinev after 2014 (see Leigh 2019, also Moustakis and German 2009, Mikhelidze 2015).

The friction may be described on the basis of the continuation of the "new threats" that provided the *sui generis* security-community with "Otherness", when the "Other" of the alliance identity was becoming actual as well. During the period following 2007, NATO-as-security community did not disappear, nor was replaced in the actuality by the alliance-identity and its other entirely. What had been happening appeared rather as the alliance identity's gradual and in fact controversial co-actualisation with the security-community without a sort of "ontological – identitary-precedence" akin to their relationship during bipolarity. Webber's depiction of the Wales Summit of 2014 as "absorbed in its terms of reference (1990, 1999 and 2010) ranging from terrorism to piracy to cyber-attacks, Afghanistan, Balkans and Iraq... a damaging internal struggle to preserve a common front" is descriptive at that juncture (Webber 2016, see also Deni 2019).

Centrifugality, which is augmented by the *sui generis* security-community and which was amplifying friction, appeared to constitute the main obstacle to NATO's re-temporalisation. It expressed reduced coherence among the member States in attributing ontological precedence to the alliance-identity over the *sui generis* security-community identity in the actuality, at a time when the Russian Federation had no such parameters. As such, centrifugality, in combination with friction, offered a horizon of mutually paralysing co-actualisation of the two identities. On the other hand, effective progress in the current re-temporalisation of

the alliance-identity through NATO's adaptation to its already emerged "Other", would mean the decrease of the centrifugality and of the friction, which in their turn would appresent further progress in the said re-temporalisation. This contingency is that of the security-community identity's regression to a function face to the self-assertion of Moscow as NATO's dialectical "Other".

What would mean Russia's ongoing aggression toward Ukraine[6], as the current peak of Russia's bipolar-like acts, in the abovementioned context of NATO's identity and temporalisation? Moscow had explained and continues to explain its current war not only on the basis of its bilateral discordances with Kiev but also on that of NATO's susceptible "anti-Russian" enlargement toward Ukraine and the Ukrainian regime's willingness to adhere[7]. In other words, the war was initiated by Moscow more as a Russo-Western confrontation than as an isolated, bilateral act. This gives the ontology of the current struggle as it is validated from the NATO side: So far, the entity's and its members' reaction included significant and continuous material aid to Ukraine, *relatively* robust and coherent political stance against Russia, more effective sanctions with less divergence among the NATO-members and determination in taking collective defence measures in contrast to the afterwards of the 2014 crisis[8], including the incorporation of Finland and of Sweden into the entity. Consequently, Russia failed to decapitate the Ukrainian government, to take Kiev or most of other important cities she targeted, her advance was stalled and she had to evacuate Kiev and Kharkov "fronts" as the Ukrainian side counterattacked. In other words, the developments on the battlefield initially validated and further encouraged the NATO identity's re-temporalisation and diminished both centrifugality and friction.

However, more recent developments in the war have apparently begun to erode, if not to reverse this directionality and re-increase centrifugality and friction. The Ukrainian counter-offensive failed to achieve breakthrough at the front. Furthermore, Russia's offensive capabilities have apparently not been suppressed, although the Muscovite army could not achieve a breakthrough either. This state-of-affairs is apparently becoming "exhausting" for part of the NATO-members', including the US' determination and coherence in helping Kiev in the prosecution of war, in contrast to their earlier and very vocal commitments and their so far significant material help. Not a Russian victory but the war of attrition has seemingly been reinvigorating centrifugality and friction in the form of increasingly questioning the continuation of the all important support to the Ukrainian war effort.

The discourse of a "diplomatic solution" is resurfacing again. This had meant at the very beginning of the war, when a Russian victory seemed to be imminent, a peace with Ukrainian concessions such as Kiev's constitutional neutrality and possible cessation of territory through plebiscites[9]. In the case of a halt or even

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[6]As of mid-December 2023.
[7]https://mid.ru/en/press_service/spokesman/briefings/1800470/#4; https://mid.ru/en/press_service/spokesman/briefings/1800470/#11 ; https://tass.com/defense/1409813.
[8]https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_193719.htm.
[9]https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/30/ukraine-offer-neutrality-meaning-constitution-russia-what-does-neutral-status-country-mean-how-would-it-work; https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-zelenskyy-says-ukraine-is-willing-to-consider-declaring-neutrality-and-offer-security-guarantees-to-russia-12576688;https://www.ft.com/content/7b341e46-d375-4817-be67-802b7fa77ef1;

decrease in NATO-members' aid to Ukraine, Kiev may be unable to prosecute a war of attrition against Russia and may have to yield to pressures of a "diplomatic solution" which would stem from the same actors.

The "diplomatic solution" with concessions to Russia means nothing short of a Russian *systemic* victory against NATO and NATO-members due to the very significance of the current event of war. It would be more consequential than Russia's total military victory over Ukrainian arms and elimination of the Kiev regime since it would suppress the ground of the current sanctions, which are the most direct expression of NATO's/NATO members' reaction against Moscow. Russian understanding of and positions in the "near-abroad" would be validated over the countries of the region. Moscow, in furtherance of a process which had already progressed until the start of the Ukrainian war, would constitute a gravity centre, an alignment alternative for third countries that are unwilling to align with the "West", in particular for normative incompatibilities with it. Moscow's already existing alignments, in particular its *entente* with China, would probably gain a new momentum as well. In other words, whereas a Russian military victory would possibly decrease centrifugality and friction toward completing NATO's re-temporalisation to alliance, a "diplomatic solution" could work in the opposite direction.

Conclusion

It is possible to study IR entities, phenomena and events in their pre-theoretical, singular, intersubjective immediacy, avoiding the ontological and temporal complications of the current IR theorising. Phenomenology offers notions and a method to conduct such a study toward their description as they are "given", as a synthetic unity formed through appresentative links between its irreducible ontological and temporal elements. NATO, as an entity of the IR field, may be studied as such.

Within this framework, it appears that NATO, which was constituted as an alliance specific to the bipolarity, was adapted to the immediacy of the post-bipolar intersubjectivity through attribution of two identities that were separately temporalised. In the actuality of the early post-bipolar era, NATO appeared rather as a *sui generis*, "outwardly" security-community and as its original self, a bipolar-type rigid alliance on the anticipatory horizon. As long as the bipolarity-type dialectic continued to remain temporalised as future contingency and the non-bipolar/non-dialectic appearance of the interstate intersubjectivity constituted the actuality, the dual-identity remained valid and viable.

This duality of identity and temporalisation was gradually eroded by the "preserved" elements of the past dialectic, through their –also gradual- transformative re-temporalisation from the anticipatory horizon to the actuality, which gained momentum from 2007 onwards. Throughout events displayed by this progressive re-temporalisation of the interstate intersubjectivity, NATO faced serious impasses that have been delaying, if not preventing, its re-temporalisation in line with the

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https://www.newsweek.com/russia-claims-dispute-over-crimea-donbas-settled-ukraine-1693474.

changing intersubjectivity. These impasses stemmed from the very nature of the dual-identity/dual-temporalisation face to the erosion of their original post-bipolar setup, appearing as "centrifugality" among the constituents of the entity that prevented coherence and "friction" as related to the non-precedence between the two different identities that were being co-temporalised in the actuality.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine created not only an acute political/ security crisis but also an ontological/temporal one for NATO. However NATO's re-temporalisation as alliance was apparently accelerated, with reduced centrifugality and friction, another dynamic has appeared as the war was prolonged and the prospects of a Ukrainian victory dimmed, once again increasing centrifugality and friction that could materialise as pressures for a "diplomatic solution" with Ukrainian concessions, which would suppress the ground of current sanctions against Moscow and validate Russian positions concerning the near-abroad at least, in relation with NATO and its members. The final picture as to the identity and temporalisation, therefore the validity and viability of the Western Alliance depends largely on the result of the current war.

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